Sunday, March 22, 2009

Form of email

Subj: Vioxx case and business ethics

Dear _________________,

I am writing this email to you because I recently read Mr. Tom Nesi's book Poison Pills: The Untold Story of the Vioxx Scandal, and you are mentioned in the book.

I contend that corporate wrongdoing is conceived, designed and implemented by individual corporate officers, employees, agents, and others, and that ethical business conduct is fostered by holding those individuals accountable. I further contend that the country's civil liability system undermines business ethics because it distracts attention and diverts economic resources away from establishing clear guidelines governing actions on behalf of a corporation and holding officers, employees and others individually accountable under those guidelines. My contentions are set forth at length in this article: Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

In my article, I use the Vioxx case as an example and I say this:

Let us start with all the shareholders who purchased Merck stock in the
weeks leading up to the Vioxx announcement and who suffered an immediate 30% or so decline in value following the announcement. Profits that Merck made from
Vioxx did not accrue to those shareholders, and they are entirely innocent of
whatever wrongdoing Merck committed regarding Vioxx; nonetheless the legal
liability system that is entrenched will give no consideration to those factors
and results in that 30% being taken from them and contributed to the recovery
that the plaintiffs eventually make.

Next consider, if Merck is guilty of wrongdoing, whether any officer or
employee of Merck will be personally punished for his participation in the
wrongdoing. There has been no indication that this is going to happen.

Next consider the hundreds of millions of dollars that plaintiffs’
attorneys will receive in the Merck litigation. Think how those sums might be
alternatively expended in order to pay for programs and activities that would
concretely advance protective and preventive objectives related to drugs such as
Vioxx. These might include: greater FDA funding for post-drug approval
monitoring and studies to detect adverse drug effects; design and implementation
of better safeguards at the physician and patient level relative to decisions
for a drug to be prescribed in a particular case; development of concrete
protocols and guidelines for testing of drugs that drug companies could follow
that would protect them against subsequent liability; development of concrete
“conflict of interest” rules for researchers and physicians involved in testing
or promoting a drug and punitive enforcement of the rules against researchers
and physicians individually.

Ultimately, there is a question of what exactly the wrongdoing of Merck was,
articulated with sufficient specificity, that Merck and other drug companies can
have advance notice of such specifics so they can avoid “wrongdoing” in the
future. For all the billions of dollars that might wind up getting paid in the
Vioxx litigation, no such concrete guidance may be forthcoming at all from the
litigation, and, if that is so, all that happens is effectively a huge transfer
from one set of parties without fault to other parties who have suffered a harm
not caused by any wrongdoing of the first parties.


Mr. Nesi's book strongly reinforced in my mind my article's contentions.

Based on your knowledge and involvement with the Vioxx case, would you care to comment on my contentions that, if society wants to be effective in fostering ethical business conduct, the law and economic resources need to be more focused on the individuals who are responsible for corporate wrongdoing and not so distracted and diverted in going after the collective "deep pockets" of thousands and millions of individuals who are innocent and not responsible for the wrongdoing?

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

A citizen's letter to judges

I am undertaking to disseminate the below "citizen's letter to judges."

Dear Judge ______,

I am writing this letter as a citizen in the midst of the hardship the nation is experiencing in the financial system crisis and associated economic downturn.

There has been much discussion about how corporate compensation structures led corporate officers and others, in furtherance of their personal gain, to abusively disregard property interests and economic value belonging to other parties (such as shareholders, bond investors and home buyers), and how this resulted in great harm to the economy, as well as to those other parties specifically.

As a citizen, I think the compensation structure under which plaintiffs' lawyers operate has resulted in a longstanding disregard of and damage to the economy and to properly balanced societal interests in the civil liability system. There have been numerous books written by critics, such as Walter Olson and Philip Howard, about this subject.

Currently, as the country tries to stimulate its economy and to grow its wealth, businesses and financial assets again, I think it would behoove all concerned to renew their attention to the parasitical activities of plaintiffs' lawyers that sap economic and financial resources and that otherwise ill serve societal interests.

I cannot add much to what critics like Olson and Howard say in their books and what they report in blogs such as http://www.overlawyered.com/.

I would, however, like to make a couple of comments.

First, it is more than ironical that, a few years before the recent collapse in bank shareholder value stemming from risky business decisions motivated by perverse compensation structures for corporate officers and others, the plaintiffs' lawyers, also driven by their perverse compensation structure, inflicted their own billions of dollars of damage on innocent bank shareholder value, such as in connection with Enron. See this article: Enron's smartest guys, crooks, victims and other saps.

Also, similar to the rampant greed of many persons involved in the mortgage loan financing industry that resulted in tantamount robbery, I think the plaintiffs' lawyers greed in their cookie cutter securities law class action litigation that they employ is also tantamount robbery. This was recently exemplified in cases involving Tyco, Xerox and Monster, Inc. See Tyco: On Snookering Clients Out Of $460 Million ; Objection in Xerox securities law class action; and Why aren’t retirement plan trustees screaming bloody murder?

Further I contend that the plaintiffs' lawyers compensation structure has resulted in undermining the fostering of ethical conduct by employees of corporations (see Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics? ).

Judges have an oversight role, and I regret to say I believe some judges fail in that role and are enablers of the plaintiffs' lawyers to the detriment of the economy and balanced societal interests. In several class action lawsuits, I have received notice that I was a member of the plaintiff class, and I have filed objections in three of them, which can be read here: Objection to attorney fees in Charter Cable class action (2004); Objection in credit card currency conversion class action (2007); Objection in Xerox securities law class action (2008); Objection in Norwthwestern Mutual Life class action (2008). In another class action involving Monster, Inc. and Middlesex County Retirement System, I did extensive emailing to government retirement systems and to others involved with corporate retirement plans to try to get them to scream bloody murder. See the entries in this link. Also see this about a Southwest Airlines class action loss suit, and entries here related to the Xerox class action.

One conclusion I have reached from my efforts is that some of those who are in a position to try to resist the travesties inflicted by the plaintiffs' lawyers believe it is futile and they only risk infliction of further injustices at the hands of the judicial system if they try.

As the country looks for ways to dig out of its problems, it is getting immersed in a new economic regimen of governmental investment and oversight that was inconceivable a year ago. The government, investors and public are taking a close look at compensation structures that led to damage to the economy. Where public funds have been brought to bear, the government is dictating limitations on executive compensation and the payment of dividends to stockholders. As previously indicated, this review should include looking at the country's legal system, the costs it imposes on the country, the compensation structures for plaintiffs' lawyers, and how the same has harmed the economy in the past and will hinder its rebuilding.

Further, just as other government regulators are under scrutiny for how well they performed in their oversight of activities that contributed to the current crisis, so judges ought to be scrutinized for how they have performed in overseeing the legal system and the costs that have been imposed on society.

I hope, your Honor, that you will think about the things I say in this letter and perhaps raise them with other judges.

Thank you very much.


Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, AL 35223
(205) 967-5586

Another form of email to HR persons

Subj: HR concerns and plaintiffs' lawyers

Dear ______________,

I am trying to combat plaintiffs' lawyers and seek allies.

HR has concerns that are affected by plaintiffs' lawyers.

One of these relates to business ethics. HR’s interest in its company’s employees should extend as a matter of course to the company’s policies and procedures for propagating ethical business conduct. If something is an impediment to that, HR should want to be aware of it. I contend that the country’s civil liability system as exploited by plaintiffs' lawyers impairs business ethics. I hope you, as an active SHRM member, will take an interest in this topic and read my article at this link: Question for HR- Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

A second HR concern is the destruction of value that has taken place in pension plan and 401(k) assets as a result of the worldwide plunge in the financial markets. Millions of employees are worried about their financial security. HR undoubtedly shares those worries, both for the employees presonally and also for company compensation, morale and motivation objectives. As the country tries to stimulate its economy and rebuild financial security, it would behoove all concerned to note the parasitical activities of plaintiffs' lawyers that sap economic and financial resources and that should no longer be tolerated.

Much has been written about how corporate compensation structures led corporate officers and others to abusive disregard for the property of other parties, such as shareholders, bond investors and home buyers, and resulted in great harm. Before the recent collapse in bank shareholder value, you might consider how the plaintiffs' lawyers, fueled by their compensation structure, inflicted their own billions of dollars of damage on innocent bank shareholders, such as in connection with Enron as discussed in this article: Enron's smartest guys, crooks, victims and other saps. Also read about these cases of cookie cutter litigation that plaintiffs' lawyers employ to rob from your company's employees' pension and retirement assets. Tyco: On Snookering Clients Out Of $460 Million ; Objection in Xerox securities law class action; Why aren’t retirement plan trustees screaming bloody murder?

Thank you.

Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, AL 35223
(205) 967-5586

Saturday, March 7, 2009

Corporate HR departments

While corporate ethics officers should be the most directly concerned about the civil liability system undermining business ethics, HR departments generally should also have an interest. Accordingly I modified my article for circulation to HR personnel and organizations. The revised article can be found here: Question for HR: Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

Question for HR (Human Resources)

Question for HR
Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

By Robert Shattuck

HR’s interest in its company’s employees should extend as a matter of course to the corporation’s policies and procedures for propagating ethical business conduct by the employees. If something is an impediment to that, HR should want to be aware of it.

This article contends that the country’s civil liability system impairs business ethics.

The contention is based on common knowledge about human nature and a common sense analysis of what is needed for society to obtain ethical behavior. HR has first hand knowledge about the company’s employees, the environment in which they work, and the company’s code of business ethics, and HR should have a good sense of employees’ thinking, psychology, decision making process and resultant actions. Accordingly, HR should be in an excellent position to evaluate the arguments that are made in this article.

Human nature; how society regulates behavior

The starting place for this articles contention is human nature and why and how society tries to regulate behavior that grows out of human nature. Let us lay out what we commonly know.
Probably growing out of the self-preservation instinct, self-seeking motivations in the human species are powerful and predominant; altruism is weak.

Societal organization entails a suppression of some of an individual’s self-serving motivation and action in favor of a greater common good. This is because promotion of the well being of a group can contribute to the well being of the individuals in the group.

Society has various mechanisms to mitigate self-seeking behavior and to alter it to promote a greater common good. These include religion; the promulgation of codes of conduct; bestowal of honors and esteem on exemplary individuals; formal education programs that teach ethics; and systems of shame and legal punishments for individuals who violate society’s strictures.
The attempt to regulate behavior occurs within a number of organizational structures. These include families, corporations, political parties, churches, and labor unions. An entire nation can be considered a smaller unit within the world community.

The family is the smallest unit in which an individual is called on to subjugate self for the good of the group. At the family level, there can develop a strong sense of identity between individual and family interests. As one moves up the organizational scale, the individual’s interests and those of the larger unit are less susceptible of conflation, and the more cognate tools referred to above are employed to articulate and implement society’s prescriptions relative to self-seeking behavior.

An individual’s powerful self-seeking motivations are for money, power, material possessions, social standing, sex, honor, esteem, aesthetic refinements, recreational pleasures and ego gratification. The first listed motivator of money can contribute significantly to the procuring of the other desired objects. Much of the motivation at a larger unit level, such as a corporation, is a collective expression of the constituent individuals’ motivations to obtain money and other objects of their desires.

Lying, cheating, stealing, defrauding, misrepresentation, concealment, breach of fiduciary obligations, bribery, blackmail, harassment, and lack of proper regard for the interests of third parties, have great potential for individuals and larger units such as corporations to obtain money. This is done, however, at the expense of other individuals and other units in the society.
The role of human intelligence is a very significant factor. Equipped with that intelligence, the human species is excellently endowed to conceive and implement dishonest activities and to exploit knowledge and information that others are lacking.

The extent and pervasiveness of dishonest, self-seeking activities by human beings is difficult to gauge.

Dishonest activities that are carried out successfully are concealed, and any researcher trying to estimate the quantum of dishonest behavior by human beings is ignorant of what has been concealed.

Dishonest activities on a large scale that are discovered get reported in the news. There is an unending procession of publicity about wrongdoing in the commercial world. It seems extensive and exhibits interesting combinations of novelty and repetition, and sometimes surprising audacity and scope. In the "boom and bust" cycles of the past decade, we have been inundated with exposures of many instances of large scale wrongdoing that was perpetrated during the "boom" part of the cycle.

In the daily news about commercial wrongdoing, gauging the aggregate amount is complicated by the presence of large swaths of gray areas of right and wrong and varying degrees of culpability of involved individuals. Also, to repeat, one never knows about wrongdoing that has taken place and that is not found out.

Dishonesty that occurs on a smaller scale is not newsworthy. Sometimes many small-scale activities of a similar, wrongful nature get reported in the aggregate. Most of us are aware of significant amounts of fraud that occur related to car insurance and car repairs, Medicare and Medicaid claims, identity theft and credit cards, cheating on taxes, overbilling on government contracts, and bribing of government officials to obtain commercial contracts. From lots of everyday experience, people are distrustful in hundreds of commercial transactions they enter into over their lifetime. All in all, it is fair to say that the total quantum of small-scale dishonesty is unknowable but that there is a lot of it that goes on.

Business ethics and the role of the law

Business ethics is supposed to counter and lessen the perpetration of dishonest activity in the commercial world.

As referred to above, business ethics, along with other forms of moral instruction imparted through religion and other institutions, are taught in society, and society has practices for bestowing honors and awards on exemplary individuals.

It is submitted, however, that, without legal punishments for individuals who violate society’s strictures, society would be feckless in its efforts to lessen dishonest commercial activities, and that society needs to be rigorous and exacting in designing and implementing its regime of legal punishments for this purpose. In this regard, it would be a troublesome sign if society was fooled into thinking that its system was functioning effectively.

What is needed in the law for it to be rigorous and exacting?

One component is close attention to whether something is done deliberately and intentionally, or whether it is done negligently, or whether it is without fault. If a party who is without fault is punished and forced to pay a cost, that can undermine the regime of legal punishments. First, it can deflect attention from making sure that intentional wrongdoers are punished (i.e., the potential for societal self-deception to the effect, well, costs were paid so punishment must have been meted out so the law must have been doing its job). Further it offers opportunity for guilty parties actively to avoid punishment by accomplishing a shift to innocent parties. Would be wrongdoers will be encouraged by the idea that the responsibility can be shifted away from them if they decide to go forward with their wrongdoing and it is found out. When innocent parties are punished while guilty ones escape responsibility, a general disrespect for the law is engendered, and that disrespect is detrimental of the law performing a purpose of fostering ethical business conduct.

As to intentional wrongdoing versus negligent wrongdoing, a regime of legal punishments might rightfully be less strict with negligent wrongdoing. This is on the basis that people, as regards intentional wrongdoing, can and should be required in an absolute way to choose consciously not do the wrong, whereas everyone is negligent to some degree from time to time and "zero tolerance" is not a realistic objective. In the case of negligence, the law can and should look closely where, for example, the negligence is slight and other intentional or other more negligent actions (including of the plaintiff) caused a loss, and the law might also take into account that available resources for investigating and punishing wrongdoing are limited, and intentional wrongdoing should have priority.

Further, the law needs to be a definite as possible in advance about what is wrongful and what is not wrongful. Unless a person is able to know what is wrongful and what is not wrongful, there the person is disabled from being able to make a decision not to do something that is wrongful, and the law will fail as a tool for fostering ethical behavior.

Differentiating among intentional wrongdoers, negligent wrongdoers, and parties who are without fault should be in the foreground in dealing with entities that represent conglomerations of individuals, such as corporations. Any corporate act of wrongdoing is designed and implemented by particular individuals in the corporation, but lots of other individuals may be wholly without fault and costs and punishments imposed on the corporation will be ultimately borne by these latter individuals. The discussion above about the importance of punishing guilty individuals, and of not punishing innocent individuals while guilty ones escape, applies in the context of a corporation, and the legal system needs to strive to impose costs and punishments on individuals who design and implement a corporate wrongdoing and to try to be sparring in imposing them on innocent individuals.

The environment in which corporate wrongdoing happens

A corporation’s main objective is to operate as profitably as possible. The greater the profits, the more shareholders and employees can be rewarded monetarily. There are pressures on a daily basis for employees to advance the corporation’s business. Time frames are relatively short, typically for the corporation to achieve the current year’s revenue and profit goals. Bonuses for the contributions that employees make are paid on an annual basis. The employees’ jobs are their means of livelihood and of providing for their families. Plugging away every day to keep the business running profitably and to give security for this year’s source of income is a top priority for employees.

A corporate wrongdoing will be something intended to benefit the corporation financially by increasing revenues, reducing expenses or avoiding or lessening losses in the business. The corporate acts that comprise the wrongdoing are conceived of, authorized by, and carried out by officers and employees of the corporation, frequently a small fraction of all the corporation’s officers and employees. Of the perpetrating group, some have fuller knowledge of the wrongful activity and others will have very limited awareness. Many employees will be completely ignorant of the wrongful actions of the corporation, as well shareholders and customers being ignorant that wrongdoing is going on.

The officers and employees who know what is going on participate as part of their job to do things to benefit the corporation’s business. Their participation evidences their value to the corporation, and their assumption is that they will be rewarded for that in the compensation they receive from the corporation.

If an officer or an employee who is part of the group that perpetrates the corporate wrongdoing thinks the activity is questionable or that it is a clear wrongdoing that has risks of being discovered, and if the officer or employee has qualms about what is being done, there is significant internalized pressure nonetheless to go along with what the corporation is doing and to not try to block the activity. Raising objections can be viewed negatively by one’s peers in the corporation or by higher ups and result in adverse impact on the employee’s status and compensation in the corporation. The actions in question may be in a gray area and not clearly wrong. A tipping factor for the employee to go along can be a perception that, if something untoward happens as a result, only the corporation as a whole will bear the brunt and the employee will escape any personal punishment for his role in the corporate wrongdoing.
In short, all corporations are in the business of earning profits, by going along the employee is just doing his job and what others want him to do, the requested action is possibly in a gray area anyway, his employer will not punish him for what he did, and any other corporation that might learn of his willingness to go along with what others wanted to him to do will not hold that against him in getting another job.

Where and how the law undermines business ethics

Let us focus on where and how the law goes awry in trying to attack corporate wrongdoing. Not all of the law goes awry but a very significant component of it does. This is a component in the law that has, by and large, been wrought by lawyers, and in particular by plaintiff’s lawyers. Let us consider them, their motivations and what they have wrought in the law.

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are part of the human species and their most powerful motivations are the same self-seeking motivations that are the most powerful for the rest of us. For plaintiffs’ lawyers, the big money is in suing the corporation. This big money comes in small bits out of lot of different pockets, many of which are entirely innocent of the wrongdoing, including shareholders who may receive slightly reduced dividends, innocent employees who may suffer slightly reduced wages, or customers of the corporation who wind up paying slightly higher prices.

To the extent that is all that happens, and no special punishment is ever imposed on the group of officers and employees who have personal culpability in the wrongdoing, there is going to be a substantial failure of deterrence effect, to wit, the officers and employees who were responsible are confirmed in their previous view that the wrongdoing they participated in had short term favorable financial results for the corporation, they the officers and employees got rewarded for the year in the compensation they received, the wrongdoing might never come to light and everything would be the rosier for it, and it is too bad the wrongdoing was discovered, but the officers and employees have come away basically unscathed, and either their current employer corporation may try a new trick next time, or else they have proved their mettle and the next corporation that employs them will be interested in seeing what they can come up for it.
The question presented is the extent to which plaintiffs’ lawyers have an effect of undermining society’s efforts to be rigorous in fining, jailing and otherwise punishing corporate officers and employees who are responsible for conceiving, authorizing, designing and implementing corporate wrongdoing.

Insight into answering the foregoing question can be obtained through a comparison of plaintiffs’ lawyers with governmental regulators, criminal prosecutors, state attorneys general and legislators, with a focus on their respective manners of compensation. The latter parties work on behalf of the public to design, implement and enforce laws and regulations and a regime of legal punishment to curtail dishonest commercial practices and conduct. The compensation they receive is reasonable for the work done, and in particular it is not geared to the dollar amount of economic activity that their public work affects (i.e., legislators and regulators don’t get paid millions of dollars because they put into effect large governmental budgets, levy commensurate amounts of taxes, and write and enforce laws and regulations that affect billions of dollars of economic activity and that impose and allocate large economic costs on and among businesses, consumers and other parties.)

Plaintiffs’ lawyers perform a similar public role in the design, implementation and enforcement of legal punishments to curtail dishonest commercial practices. Their compensation, which is huge, is geared to the amounts of economic activity that their work affects and to the economic costs that they get shifted around among various parties; the larger the scope of their lawsuits and the greater the dollar amount of the costs they can get shifted around, the greater their compensation. This manner of compensation of plaintiffs’ lawyers creates very powerful incentives for them to seek the objectives of (i) expansion of harms or detriments for which a payment should be made, (ii) higher rather than lower amounts that should be paid, (iii) expansion of liability where there is no fault, (iv) disregard of distinctions between intentionally culpable, negligently culpable and faultless parties, especially in the context of corporations comprised of a conglomeration of employees, shareholders and customers , (v) disregard of culpability of plaintiffs in their own injuries and harms, (vi) not having clear rules in advance about what is wrongful and what is not wrongful, so that a person does not know what is wrongful and cannot make a decision not to do a wrongful act, and exposing every decision and action to an ex post facto determination that it was wrongful and for which there is liability, (vii) disregard of rational cost/benefit principles, (viii) the invocation of junk science, and (ix) usurpation by them and the courts of the powers of the legislative branch and the executive branch regulatory apparatus.

These objectives of plaintiffs’ lawyers are inconsistent with the need, as discussed, for the law to be exacting in punishing and imposing costs on guilty individuals and in not punishing innocent individuals while guilty individuals are not held responsible, and of providing clear rules in advance about what is wrongful and what is not, in order that people may make a decision not to do a wrongful act. The plaintiffs’ lawyers have been very successful in achieving their objectives. This has bred contempt and disdain for the law, swallowed up large amounts of resources that could be available for other activities more effective for promoting business ethics, and has been otherwise distractive and undermining of society’s use of legal punishments to curtail commercial wrongdoing.

The Vioxx case as an example of how the law fails business ethics

Take for example the Vioxx litigation that recently worked its way through the judicial pipeline.

Let us start with all the shareholders who purchased Merck stock in the weeks leading up to the Vioxx announcement and who suffered an immediate 30% or so decline in value following the announcement. Profits that Merck made from Vioxx did not accrue to those shareholders, and they are entirely innocent of whatever wrongdoing Merck committed regarding Vioxx; nonetheless the legal liability system that is entrenched will give no consideration to those factors and results in that 30% being taken from them and contributed to the recovery that the plaintiffs eventually make.

Next consider, if Merck is guilty of wrongdoing, whether any officer or employee of Merck will be personally punished for his participation in the wrongdoing. There has been no indication that this is going to happen.

Next consider the hundreds of millions of dollars that plaintiffs’ attorneys have or will receive in the Merck litigation. Think how those sums might be alternatively expended in order to pay for programs and activities that would concretely advance protective and preventive objectives related to drugs such as Vioxx. These might include: greater FDA funding for post-drug approval monitoring and studies to detect adverse drug effects; design and implementation of better safeguards at the physician and patient level relative to decisions for a drug to be prescribed in a particular case; development of concrete protocols and guidelines for testing of drugs that drug companies could follow that would protect them against subsequent liability; development of concrete "conflict of interest" rules for researchers and physicians involved in testing or promoting a drug and punitive enforcement of the rules against researchers and physicians individually.

Ultimately, there is a question of what exactly the wrongdoing of Merck was, articulated with sufficient specificity, that Merck and other drug companies can have advance notice of such specifics so they can avoid "wrongdoing" in the future. For all the billions of dollars that winds up getting paid in the Vioxx litigation, no such concrete guidance may be forthcoming at all from the litigation, and, if that is so, all that happens is effectively a huge transfer from one set of parties without fault to other parties who have suffered a harm not caused by any wrongdoing of the first parties.

The problem of the plaintiffs’ lawyers

The situation with Vioxx is emblematic of how plaintiffs’ lawyers cause a huge consumption of manpower, economic resources and mental attention and effort that has little or nothing to do with accomplishing reduction of corporate wrongdoing and is a corresponding enormous diversion of those resources from society’s efforts to reduce corporate wrongdoing.

In evaluating this argument that plaintiffs’ lawyers undermine the promotion of business ethics, we should not listen to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Our country has seen enough in recent years of baneful effects of large amounts of compensation that create conflicts of interest and that that cause the recipient to advocate or follow a course of action that will increase that compensation and contrary to the better interests of other individuals and groups. Corporate executives standing to gain fortunes from stock options committed massive accounting frauds that contributed to maintaining and increasing lofty stock price levels that would enormously benefit them under their stock options and other compensation arrangements. Accountants have been charged with faulty accounting work arising from the conflict of having lucrative consulting work with the audit client. Stock analysts have been inappropriately influenced in their stock reports by reason of getting compensation based on investment banking business their employer gets from companies the analyst covers. Brokerage firms corrupted the IPO market by allocating stock in hidden exchanges for inflated commissions on unrelated transactions. Mutual funds and insurance brokers have acted in wrongful disregard of conflicts of interest in order to increase their revenues and profits.

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are no different. They are conflicted to the core by their compensation arrangements and are incapable of rendering to society any honest evaluation of how well the current civil liability system is in serving society’s objective of promoting ethical business behavior.

Conclusion

The above is a very descriptive, common sensical, common knowledge based explication of how the civil liability system undermines the promotion of ethical business conduct, and how the law results in a significant diversion of economic resources away from beneficial and desirable ethics programs and activities and misallocates those resources to wasteful and counterproductive uses.

First and foremost corporate ethics officers should be concerned if the civil liability system undermines the accomplishing of their business ethics objectives.

HR should also be interested. As stated, HR has its own first hand knowledge about the company’s employees, the environment in which they work, and the company’s code of business ethics, and HR should have its own sense of employees’ thinking, psychology, decision making process and resultant actions. Accordingly, HR should be in an excellent position to make its own evaluation of the arguments that made by this article and should be in a position to consult with the corporate ethics officer and with higher level management on this issue.

It is appreciated that HR and ethics officers are subject to higher level corporate management. If the civil liability system does in fact materially undermine the corporate objective to nurture and inculcate ethical conduct by the employees as argued in this article, that could be venturing into a bigger domain than ethics officers or HR are in charge of, and both HR and ethics officers may be constrained in raising with management suggestions or ideas that do not fits within the big picture strategy and tactics of corporate management in responding to and dealing with the travesties of our nation's civil liability system.

Regardless of what higher up management may think, it is hoped that HR will at least read this article and reach its own conclusions, whether or not HR can act on its conclusions.

Sunday, March 1, 2009

Ethics Resource Center

Email sent to the directors of the Ethics Resource Center:

Subj: Would the ERC please take a position?

Dear ______________,

Given the vaunted standing of the ERC, I respectfully think the organization should have a reaction to the argumentation I set forth in this online article: Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

Such reaction might be one of the following:

1. The analysis and argumentation set forth in your article have been adequately explored already by ethics professionals, and we refer you to the following citations in the literature: _______________________;

2. It is the view of the ERC that your analysis and argumentation do not raise any meaningful issue or question relative to the ERC's mission and activities of the "study and promotion of ethical behavior in organizations worldwide" and 85 years of "champion[ing] ethical business practices by helping organizations strengthen their ethics culture and encourage high standards of business behavior based on ethical values;"

3. It is beyond the scope of the ERC to try to evaluate or make advocacy concerning the nation's civil liability system and how the system affects employee decisions to act or not act ethically; or

4. Your article raises significant issues and questions that ethics professionals ought to consider, and the ERC would like to invite you to participate with the ERC in further investigation, development, discussion, and publication of the ideas in your article.

I very much hope that the ERC can manage a more respectable response than the ECOA (see this letter and links).

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Thursday, February 12, 2009

APPE follow up

#1 Interchange with one professor:


From: weil@iit.edu

To: RDShatt@aol.com

Sent: 2/2/2009 7:05:37 A.M. Central Standard Time

Subj: RE: APPE Executive Committee: Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

You have written to me several times before. I do not understand your ungrammatical and incoherent sentence below that begins “I believe….” Sincerely, Vivian Weil

From: RDShatt
To: weil@iit.edu
Sent: 2/2/2009 8:08:03 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Re: APPE Executive Committee: Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

Thank you for replying, Professor Weil.

I reflected about the grammar at the time I wrote the sentence but left it alone. Also I can appreciate that the referent of "obstacle" is ambiguous. I don't know whether it is grammatically correct, but the referent of "that" is "making changes in the civil liability system". One of the definitions I find for "ken" is "range of vision" and I trust the word "ken" is ok.

Let me revise the sentence as follow:
"I believe there is an obstacle to getting such attention because my contention contains a thrust towards making changes in the civil liability system and that is simply beyond the ken of professionals in the business ethics field."

Also, perhaps I expressed myself more clearly in this letter I wrote to ECOA members, of which you may have received a copy.

With the foregoing clarifications, may I repeat my solicitation made in my email concerning whether you, as an academic in the business ethics field, have any comment about what I said in my email [beyond, of course, what you have said below].

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

#2 Interchange with another professor:

Dear Mr. Shattuck:

Your article seems to have at least two severe methodological problems: 1) How do you measure the effect of civil liability on business ethics. Without an accurate measure, it is hard to know what effect of any civil liability has. 2) Even with a measure of improved or declining ethics (something more than newspaper stories), there is a problem about measuring cause and effect. Civil liability have grown because of falling ethics, rather than ethics falling because of civil liability rules. Usually, this sort of cause-effect problem can be solved only statistical analysis of data over an extended period--if at all.I'm also curious why you do not extend your argument to the criminal law as well. When civil liability fails, government often falls back on the criminal law--as in the recent failure of a peanut processor in Virginia to meet basic health standards.


Dear Professor______,

Thank you very much for your reply.

I have not progressed to the point of thinking that statistically measuring anything is a predicate to advocating and following a course of action. It would be nice if such measurement could be done, and I have no problem with attempts to do it, but sometimes it is necessary to make one's best evaluation of the choices and act without the benefit of statistical evidence and measurement. For example, President Obama may, without the benefit of statistical measurement, change US policy and practice on torture and interrogation techniques on the basis of a contention that prior practices do not produce a benefit that outweighs the effects of negative world and/or public opinion, of increasing risks of torture applied to our own forces, and of helping terrorist recruitment.

The central contention in my article is that ultimately it is individual human beings who conceive, design and implement unethical and wrongful corporate activities, and that the law can best foster ethical business conduct by focusing on and using available economic resources to ferret out and sanction, whether under the criminal law or the civil law, those individuals who are responsible for the corporate wrongdoing. Instead of that, the civil liability system undermines this focus and distracts and diverts resources away from such focus and thereby ultimately undermines business ethics, as more fully explicated in my article.

Again, thank you for replying.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor back to me]

You may underestimating the possibilities of statistical measurement. For work on torture, see, for example, Jean Maria Arrigo, “A Utilitarian Argument against Torture,” Science and Engineering Ethics 10.3 (2004):1–30. The best evidence in that area comes from a surprising source, the records of the Inquisition. An administration that had checked what was known before acting might have avoided the disaster the Bush administration brought upon itself and the country.Perhaps if we looked for it, we could find surprising sources for business ethics also. Sometimes we have to act without adequate evidence, but we should avoid such risky conduct wherever possible, don't you think? Changing the civil liability system is a big change. Republican efforts to reduce corporate liability to malpractice suits may have had something to do with the current low status to which business has sunk--not at all what they intended. Claims about what undermines what presuppose theories of human motivation, itself a vexed subject. That's why I am not inclined to rush in the direction you suggest--and why my first impulse is to ask, "What do we think? What do we know? What can we prove?"--



Dear Professor ______,

Thank you very much again for replying again.

I would have to say that I am having a great deal of difficulty in getting ethics academics and professionals just to initiate the process by the first step of considering the matter and asking and trying to answer tentatively your initial "What do we think?" question.

I don't know whether you have any interest in or time for this topic, but, if you do, I would love to dialogue more with you about it.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Mr. Shattuck:

Here's my take on your argument.

First, I think you have an overly simplified (economist's) view of the business corportations. Let me quote

In short, all corporations are in the business of earning profits,
by going along the employee is just doing his job and what others
want him to do, the requested action is possibly in a gray area
anyway, his employer will not punish him for what he did, and any
other corporation that might learn of his willingness to go along
with what others wanted to him to do will not hold that against him
in getting another job.

Most corporations I have interviewed officers of seem to think of themselves as in the business of making something--auto parts, cell phones, turbines, and so on. They want to make enough money to stay in business but they are not interested in "maximizing profit for investors". Indeed, the few companies when I interviewed officers, all MBAs, who held the maximize return position, are out of business. The scandals I studied do not seem to involve employees just doing their job. They were often aware that what they were being asked to do might be illegal, something beyond what an employer can properly ask. All the examples of 'gray areas' that make the news are actually black. This, of course, is just "what I think". But I think you need to put it beside what you think. The facts are themselves a problem in this area.Second, I don't think you have your history right. When government regulation is strict, there's not much need for plaintiff's lawyers. As we enter a world of "deregulation", most things go wrong and there's more work for plaintiff's lawyers. We've just been through 30 years of deregulation, so people may have fallen back on the plaintiff's bar as their last resort in the attempt to get justice. Yet, there has been some attempt to measure the "litigation explosion". The numbers I've seen suggest that the explosion, real enough, is in suits between corporations, not in suits by individuals against corporations. So, here you may have your facts wrong.You also seem at the end of your paper to get your incentives wrong. Civil liability is not about criminal guilt. It is primarily a way to internalize externalities, that is, to make actors pay for the full cost of what they do (especially if they have deep pockets as a result of capturing the positive value of what they do). So, the plaintiff's bar is, by suing, helping to correct for market failure. It would be better if this were done in a less expensive way. But deregulation has cut off most of those other options (the equivalent of the workmen's compensation system). The innocent stockholder whose company has been socked with a big judgment now has an incentive to find better management or change the policies that cost so much money. That's the market regulating itself.Give you something to think about?--

Dear Professor _______,

Thank you once again.

You raise significant points that are deserving of factoring in. I am starved for interlocutors to critique my argumentation, as you have initiated here, and I have great desire for dialogue. I don't, however, want to impose on you and out you off.

To try to keep from put you off, I would like to mention only your point about "gray" or "black."

One of the complaints about plaintiffs lawyers is they prefer that there not be delineation of what is black or white as would allow a person to make decisions in reliance on clear delineations of what is black and what is white. Rather, the plaintiffs lawyers prefer to be in a position to contend for liability (and hence attorneys fees for themselves) on finding ex post facto some possibly plausible basis for contending that something should have been done or should not have been done, and thereby give rise to liability. Further, there is an in terrorem element that results in a settlement without there ever being a determination of what is or is not wrongful action. In my article, I give as an example the Vioxx litigation and say the following:
Next consider the hundreds of millions of dollars that plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive in the Merck litigation. Think how those sums might be alternatively expended in order to pay for programs and activities that would concretely advance protective and preventive objectives related to drugs such as Vioxx. These might include: greater FDA funding for post-drug approval monitoring and studies to detect adverse drug effects; design and implementation of better safeguards at the physician and patient level relative to decisions for a drug to be prescribed in a particular case; development of concrete protocols and guidelines for testing of drugs that drug companies could follow that would protect them against subsequent liability; development of concrete “conflict of interest” rules for researchers and physicians involved in testing or promoting a drug and punitive enforcement of the rules against researchers and physicians individually.Ultimately, there is a question of what exactly the wrongdoing of Merck was, articulated with sufficient specificity, that Merck and other drug companies can have advance notice of such specifics so they can avoid “wrongdoing” in the future. For all the billions of dollars that might wind up getting paid in the Vioxx litigation, no such concrete guidance may be forthcoming at all from the litigation, and, if that is so, all that happens is effectively a huge transfer from one set of parties without fault to other parties who have suffered a harm not caused by any wrongdoing of the first parties.
I have many more examples I would like to discuss, but I don't want to put you off.

Again, I very much appreciate your replying at all.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor back to me]

The reason I said nothing about those two paragraphs of your is that I agree with them. But I think you have the causal mechanism wrong. The plaintiff's lawyers are basically Democrats. (At least, that's who they give most of their money to most years.) The people who cut back on FDA funding and loosened test standards were Republicans (who also attack plaintiff's lawyers). The lawyers' fees you lament are a byproduct of Republican deregulation, not the work of Democratic plaintiff's lawyers. So, I don't regard the plaintiff's lawyers are bad guys in this--any more than I would regard flies as the cause of garbage piling up. History is important in the analysis of social problems. The law journals actually contain a good deal of empirical research on this issue.I'm a philosopher; so, I only dabble in empirical stuff when I have. And, no doubt it's also because I'm a philosopher that I am not put off by an intelligent argument. But I do think you need to look at the empirical literature before you suggest cures for the problem you identify. Note: I agree that the problem exists. But, since I disagree about the cause, I may disagree about the cure.--


Dear Professor ____,

You continue to raise significant points.

In our system of government, the democratically elected legislative branch is supposed to enact the laws, the executive branch is supposed to execute the law, the regulatory function is something of a hybrid of the legislative and executive functions, and the judicial branch is supposed to be limited to applying the laws and regulations that have been enacted or promulgated to specific cases and interpreting such laws and regulations where there is ambiguity. The judicial branch is not supposed to make additional or different law or regulations from those enacted and promulgated by the legislative and executive branches.

An argument the plaintiffs' lawyers have is that the legislative branch and regulatory apparatus are corrupt and fail to represent properly their public constituency in the policy decisions they make, the laws they enact, the regulations they promulgate, and their enforcement of the same.I agree that the legislative branch is corrupt and the regulatory apparatus is tainted.I would only like the plaintiffs' lawyers to say, "We agree with your analysis and arguments about the civil liability system and the reforms that are needed, but you need to do something about the corrupt legislatures in the United States."To which I say to the plaintiffs' lawyers, "Let us be join arms and use some of your billions of dollars of revenues to proclaim to the public the corruption of its legislatures and campaign to defeat all incumbent legislators on general principles."

It continues to be a pleasure dialoguing with you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor back to me]

Wasn't this a line in Man from La Manche?--"'To which I say to the plaintiffs' lawyers, "Let us be join arms and use some of your billions of dollars of revenues to proclaim to the public the corruption of its legislatures and campaign to defeat all incumbent legislators on general principles."'

[me to the professor]

Why I feel so strongly and Why I feel so strongly about plaintiffs lawyers

[the professor to me]

Why do you think plaintiff's lawyers have "fooled" anyone? Their status is relatively low in polls (though above used car sellers). Stirring up litigation has been looked upon for many centuries. Are you sure you're not kicking someone who's already down (rather than, like Don Quixote, fighting an "unwinnable fight", as I first thought)? Anyway, step 1 has got to be to check your facts


Dear Professor _____,

Again, thank you for replying.

I think the main "fact" that you are referring to is the extent to which the current condition of the civil liability system is an organic societal reaction to compensate for a long period of deregulation, as opposed to being a result of plaintiffs lawyers aggressively molding the system to expand their litigation domain and to increase their riches derived from that system which they have done without due regard to societal interests (which require balancing) in the civil liability system and in ways detrimental to those societal interests and how they are balanced.

I am not sure how one goes about establishing the above "fact" one way or the other. My inclination would be to survey and evaluate, on an individual basis or in a more collective way, legal cases that transpire and ask how well societal interests are being served or are being ill served in those legal cases, and in the latter case why are they being ill served.

I think societal interests were ill served in the Vioxx litigation that I use as an example in my article. I think you indicated you agreed with me. If you are interested, go to http://www.overlawyered.com/ for an excellent chronicle and compendium of cases and developments in the civil liability system, start reviewing the same, and ask yourself how well societal interests are being served in balanced way in the cases you read about. I will be more than pleased to discuss with you what you find and think.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor to me]

My point about the "fact" was that I've seen articles in law journals that did systematic studies on a large scale, for example, measuring increase in various classes of cases, comparing payouts over time using inflation-adjusted data, and so on. Your method tends to pick up the foam on the surface of the sea, missing the larger reality beneath.--


Dear Professor _____,

The leading authors of whom I am aware are Eisenberg and Miller. This link lists Eisenberg's articles:
http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/facbib/faculty.asp?facid=46&alphapage=0

There are a number of articles I would like to read. The below article on the list particularly jumps out, but all I can get free online is the abstract.

"Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study" (with Geoffrey P. Miller), 1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 27-78 (2004).

Abstract: Study of two comprehensive class action case data sets covering 1993-2002 shows that the amount of client recovery is overwhelmingly the most important determinant of the attorneys' fee award. Even in cases in which the courts engage in the lodestar calculation (the product of reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate), the client's recovery generally explains the pattern of awards better than the lodestar. Thus, the time and expense of a lodestar calculation may be wasteful. We also find no robust evidence that either recoveries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys increased over time. The mean fee award in common fund cases is well below the widely-quoted one-third figure, constituting 21.9 percent of the recovery across all cases for a comprehensive data set of published cases. A scaling effect exists: fees constitute a lower percent of the client's recovery as the client's recovery increases. Fees are also correlated with risk: the presence of high risk is associated with a higher fee, while low risk cases generate below-average fees. Fees as a percent of class recovery were found to be higher in federal than state court. The presence of "soft" relief (such as injunctive relief or coupons) has no material effect on the fee, whether or not the soft relief was calculated in the quantified benefit for the class used as the basis for computing the attorney's fee. The study also addressed costs and expenses. Like fees, these displayed significant scale effects. The paper proposes a simple methodology by which courts can evaluate the reasonableness of fee requests.

By coincidence, I recently objected in a class action in which Professor Miller filed an affidavit. I wrote Professor Miller [this email]


I have not heard back from Professor Miller yet and will not be surprised if I don't hear back.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor to me]

Remind me again of the point of this letter. You have an article below, published in a respectable legal journal, that seems to show that the total rewards plaintiff's lawyers win has not been rising (in the low inflationary period 1993-2002), that contingent fees seem to average 21.9% rather than the 1/3 I generally hear about, and that recent court attempts to push down fees as a way to reduce the attractiveness of lawsuits for a contingency--the only recourse of the poor and middle class--the lodestar calculation--doesn't seem to work. You do not contest these claims directly. Instead you wrote Miller asking to cite a book responding to your articles. I'd have thought you could do your own literature search. No wonder he didn't answer.By the way, I sometimes don't get answers even when I send a piece to another scholar asking for comment. So, I'd advise you now that you have got your list of articles to read, to go and read them. Focus on the arguments, not on the personalities.-

[me to professor]

No, the article is Miller's.

It was a matter of coincidence that Miller filed an affidavit in a class action lawsuit in which I was an objector in the lawsuit, and I wrote the email in question to Miller telling him that I was an objector and had strong anti-plaintiffs lawyers views and inquiring what book (or article) he considered a good statement of the case in support of the plaintiffs lawyers and that responded to well known books and arguments that state the case against plaintiffs' lawyers. I am not aware of any such pro-plaintiffs lawyers books that do. I have asked various persons to be cited to such books and have not been directed to any books. I have googled and thus far have not turned up anything.

One excellent book stating the case against plaintiffs lawyers is The Rule of Lawyers by Walter Olson. I found this highly critical review of Olson's book: http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_nylawjournal-lawyers_rule.htm. I disagree strongly with the review. Maybe I will write to the author of the review. I have done my own writings which I think address at least some of the reviewer's criticisms. You can find my writings here: http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/search/label/M.%20My%20writings and, perhaps with some redundancy, here: http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/2007/11/then-i-got-verbose-with-professors.html

I wonder which one of you and me is going to get worn out first.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

[the professor to me]

Me.--

[me to the professor]

Thank you very much for your time, Professor ____. I will move on in search of my next interlocutor. Hope you have a great year. Sincerely, Robert Shattuck

[the professor to me]

You're welcome.--