Showing posts with label D. Law Professors. Show all posts
Showing posts with label D. Law Professors. Show all posts

Friday, December 24, 2010

Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn?

From: RDShatt@aol.com
To: grundfest@stanford.edu, Cox@law.duke.edu, klacroix@oakbridgeins.com
Sent: 12/24/2010 4:30:08 A.M. Central Standard Time

Subj: Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn?

Dear Professors Grundfest and Cox, Mr. LaCroix, and Mr. Coffey (address for Mr. Coffey not yet found),

I have read with interest Mr. LaCroix's above referenced post in his blog. You may glean the extent of my interest from my own blog How To Combat Plaintiffs' Lawyers .

I would like to offer some comments.

First, some rhetorical and/or loaded questions: Who and what are the drivers and determinants of the state of the law? Is it plaintiffs' lawyers and their lobbying and other influence with lawmakers, judges and others? Is it judges who have done an adequate policy evaluation of their judicial actions and decisions, insofar as they have discretion regarding the same? Is it academics who have debated the way the law should be and who make recommendations about the same that are accepted by lawmakers and judges? Is it critics, such as The Wall Street Journal?

Also, insofar as plaintiffs' lawyers are the drivers and determinants. to what extent do they exert their influence to achieve a state of the law that benefits themselves to the detriment of the societal interest in how the law operates? How demanding should academics and citizens be of their lawmakers and judges that those persons exert great skepticism about any input the plaintiffs' lawyers have regarding how the law should be and give the plaintiffs' lawyers no benefit of the doubt, including, for example, not finding it an adequate justification that there is "some deterrent effect" from private securities litigation, or that a "private/public partnership" has performed better than "public" alone when there is a choice to beef up with more funding for the "public" effort?

I took particular note of Mr. LaCroix's statement that "there are a large number of sophisticated, well-informed and profit motivated institutional investors that continue to actively participate in securities litigation, some serving frequently as lead plaintiffs." The reason for my interest is that I was once notified of a class action that caused me to send scores of emails to governmental retirement plans and members of the National Institute of Pension Plan Administrators, asking why they weren't "screaming bloody murder." You may read the text of those emails here http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/2008/11/why-arent-government-retirement-systems.html and here http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/2008/11/why-arent-retirement-plan-trustees.html . I did not get a single response.

I did not think, at the time, about "pay to play" type stuff going on in securities class action litigation that could keep parties from screaming bloody murder. Trust The Wall Street Journal to enlighten me in February with this item Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow .

On the question of whether individual contibution is needed in order to achieve a better deterrent effect, I have taken the tack of trying to introduce the subject to academics and other professionals in the business ethics field. I have done this mainly through an article I have written that you can find at this link: Does the Civil Liability System Undermine Business Ethics? I have made scant headway in interesting ethics professionals in the subject matter.

Thank you for reading this email.

Sincerely,
Rob Shattuck

Thursday, February 12, 2009

Follow up with Prof. Miller

From: RDShatt
To: geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu
Sent: 2/9/2009 8:06:44 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Your articles regarding class action attorney' fees

Dear Professor Miller,

In follow up to my email of January 30th to you, I wish to indicate I am interested in some of your articles about class action attorneys' fees, such as "Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study", 1 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 27-78 (2004). I would like to read the entire article but thus far have accessed only this abstract:

Abstract: Study of two comprehensive class action case
data sets covering 1993-2002 shows that the amount of client recovery is
overwhelmingly the most important determinant of the attorneys' fee award. Even
in cases in which the courts engage in the lodestar calculation (the product of
reasonable hours and a reasonable hourly rate), the client's recovery generally
explains the pattern of awards better than the lodestar. Thus, the time and
expense of a lodestar calculation may be wasteful. We also find no robust
evidence that either recoveries for plaintiffs or fees of their attorneys
increased over time. The mean fee award in common fund cases is well below the
widely-quoted one-third figure, constituting 21.9 percent of the recovery across
all cases for a comprehensive data set of published cases. A scaling effect
exists: fees constitute a lower percent of the client's recovery as the client's
recovery increases. Fees are also correlated with risk: the presence of high
risk is associated with a higher fee, while low risk cases generate
below-average fees. Fees as a percent of class recovery were found to be higher
in federal than state court. The presence of "soft" relief (such as injunctive
relief or coupons) has no material effect on the fee, whether or not the soft
relief was calculated in the quantified benefit for the class used as the basis
for computing the attorney's fee. The study also addressed costs and expenses.
Like fees, these displayed significant scale effects. The paper proposes a
simple methodology by which courts can evaluate the reasonableness of fee
requests.

It seems to me it is one thing to investigate and determine what the facts show about amounts of attorneys' fees historically and whether fees in a particular case currently are in line or not in line with precedent, but it is also even more important to evaluate the benefits and detriments of the litigation to not only the plaintiffs but also to members of the public who are not parties to the litigation but for whom the litigation has consequences, in order to reach a determination of whether the litigation justifies the amount of the attorneys' fees.

My blog goes on ad nauseum why I think the amount of attorneys' fees is not justified.

Have you written an article, or can you cite me to an article, that does the kind of evaluation I am talking about and concludes that the amount of attorneys' fees is justified?

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck


From: millerg@exchange.law.nyu.edu
To: RDShatt@aol.com
Sent: 2/9/2009 3:51:31 P.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: RE: Your articles regarding class action attorneys' fees

our paper was not normative in the sense of what fees should be but rather just asked what they are.
[Message delivered by NotifyLink]

Saturday, February 7, 2009

Email to Professor Geoffrey Miller

From: RDShatt
To: geoffrey.miller@nyu.edu
Sent: 1/30/2009 6:18:52 P.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Papadakis v. Northwestern Mutual Life

Dear Professor Miller,

I was a non-professional objector in the above case. I have strong anti-plaintiffs' lawyers views that I have expounded in this blog. My particular objection in the above case (which includes as Exhibits other class action objections I have made) is appended below.

I have read your affidavit.

I am writing to inquire what single book or single article you would refer me to as being the best statement of the case in defense of plaintiffs' lawyers and that is responsive to the various arguments made against plaintiffs lawyers, such as by Walter Olson and Philip Howard, and by myself.

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Thursday, October 16, 2008

Prof. Cohen

From: RDShatt
To: cohenm@uchastings.edu
Sent: 10/16/2008 7:43:49 P.M. Central Daylight Time
Subj: Re: Please see my blog entry re: Prof. Marsha Cohen's WSJ letter. ...

Thank you for replying, Prof. Cohen. In my proposed project, there is no need whatsoever to agree, just state views on some significant public legal policy issues.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

In a message dated 10/5/2008 2:53:10 P.M. Central Daylight Time, cohenm@uchastings.edu writes:

Hmmmm, I imagine that we wouldn’t actually AGREE on this subject.
I guess there are a LOT of Bob Shattucks. As there are a lot of Marsha Cohens. So if you were the one from Paterson, NJ, you probably would’ve pointed that out ................... --
Professor Marsha N. Cohen

Prof. Alan Weisbard

From: RDShatt
To: weisbard@wisc.edu
Sent: 10/16/2008 7:33:24 P.M. Central Daylight Time
Subj: Re: Please see my blog entry re: Prof. Marsha Cohen's WSJ letter.

Thank you very much, Prof. Weisbard.

Both elitism and cowardice are understandable in academia. Please consult Prof. John Lachs of Vanderbilt University as to the phenomenon of cowardice ( "Intellectuals and Courage"), and, as to elitist arrogance, the ECOA would provide you with some excellent drinking buddies (see ECOA correspondence ).

Now, if you desire to engage in some intellectually respectable dialogue, I would be very pleased to engage with you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

In a message dated 10/6/2008 10:57:21 A.M. Central Daylight Time, weisbard@wisc.edu writes:

Dear Mr. Shattuck,
Please add me to the list of law professors summarily dismissive of your efforts.
Thank you, Alan J. Weisbard

Sunday, October 5, 2008

Email to the law professors today

From: RDShatt
To: ______
Sent: 10/5/2008 _____ P.M. Central Daylight Time
Subj: Please see my blog entry re: Prof. Marsha Cohen's WSJ letter

Please see my blog entry re: Prof. Marsha Cohen's WSJ letter.

Please contact me if you would like to participate in a letter or letters to The Wall Street Journal or possibly other newspapers or periodicals.

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Saturday, October 4, 2008

Prof. Marsha Cohen's WSJ letter

Professor Marsha Cohen of the Hastings College of Law wrote the below letter to The Wall Street Journal commenting on the Journal's op/ed piece "The Tort Bar's Comeback" from September 16, 2008 that appears below the letter.

I think Professor Cohen and other law professors ought to have a lot more to say on the subject than this brief letter. I have in the past advocated a letter to the Journal that "frames" the important issues (see this entry) and further have advocated the taking of positions on the issues (see this entry). As indicated in the first link, the idea of "dueling" letters took my fancy.

I will probably resume the efforts I made in 2004/5. This seems particularly appropriate in light of the significant economic problems the country is facing and the need for reducing waste and increasing efficiencies in the economy.


SEPTEMBER 27, 2008
China Could Use Tort Lawyers, More Accountability

It is ironic that you picked Sept. 16 for one of your periodic editorial attacks on the civil justice system ("The Tort Bar's Comeback," Review & Outlook) in light of the news breaking on the same day about the tragic harm to a large number of Chinese babies from infant formula contaminated by the industrial chemical melamine. The same chemical was responsible for the deaths of many Americans' pets some months ago, also because of contamination originating in China. Why are Chinese products causing so much consumer harm (both there and, because of our globalized marketplace, here as well)? China has neither well-enforced regulatory mechanisms nor a torts/insurance system to protect consumers, although my understanding is that it is moving to adopt both. Without a civil justice system that enables those harmed to seek recompense from those who caused them harm, why would any product seller bother to invest in quality control or any other product safety measure?

Are there unethical plaintiffs attorneys? Sure. And there are unethical defense attorneys as well. Are there bad judgments made in personal injury decisions? Absolutely. But there are probably as many denying compensation as granting too much of it. While there are undoubtedly more efficient and equally fair ways to assure appropriate compensation to those injured by economic actors, demonizing the entire civil justice system is an entirely ineffective way to galvanize support for systemic change.

Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to be the unfortunate victims of accidental harm.

Prof. Marsha N. Cohen
University of California
Hastings College of the Law
San Francisco




REVIEW & OUTLOOK
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
The Tort Bar's Comeback

As voters mull the stakes in this year's election, here's an issue that ought to ring alarms in the ears of serious people: tort reform. After 20 years of state and federal efforts to reform a runaway legal system, the trial bar is reviving the monster.

At the federal level, lawyers and law firms invested in 2006 more than $85 million to get pro-lawsuit Democrats elected. Congress's new leadership has begun a political repayment plan -- packing legislation with provisions to increase the number and size of lawsuits. So far, this effort has been largely stymied by President Bush's veto threat. The tort bar sees 2008 as the real prize; it has already thrown $107 million toward increasing Democratic majorities.


The trial barons are making more progress at the state level, as described in a report by the American Tort Reform Association. States had been making progress: New laws cleaned up venue requirements, reformed punitive and noneconomic damages, and enacted medical malpractice reform. So-called "judicial hellholes" like Texas and Mississippi have seen insurers return and premiums fall.


The trial bar is fighting back, with success. In last year's legislative session, Michigan lawmakers proposed repealing safeguards for prescription drug providers; Maryland legislators wanted to revoke medical liability reforms; and Florida's legislature entertained the nullification of its joint and several liability reforms. The trial bar's big coup was in Colorado, where Democratic Governor Bill Ritter signed a law increasing previous limits on noneconomic damages.


Lawyers have also been laboring to create opportunities for more lawsuits, more money and more time to sue. Last year, Alabama saw legislation that would allow a tort claim to continue even after a plaintiff had died, while California proposed authorizing lawsuits for any violation of privacy. New Mexico and New Jersey passed laws authorizing citizens to file "false claims" suits on behalf of the state -- in effect turning private individuals into state bounty hunters.
Four states -- Colorado, Washington, Illinois and Texas -- considered proposals to increase the size of awards plaintiffs could claim, and with it attorneys' contingency fees. The tort bar pushed bills across the country to expand "consumer protection" damages and in at least three states to allow plaintiffs to claim damages for "emotional harm" when their pets are injured. In Maryland and Oregon, lawyers successfully shepherded new laws to extend the time in which plaintiffs could file lawsuits.


Plenty of legislatures remain wary of walking back down the highway of ruinous lawsuits, while many Governors say they'll veto this legislation. Still, the lawsuit industry is counting on discontent this fall to help flip a few more legislatures and governorships to pro-tort majorities, laying the groundwork for their proposals to become law. Tort reformers will have to push back.

Friday, September 19, 2008

Nada from the law professors

I did not receive a reply from any law professor to my March/April 2008 email or my August 2008 email.

Wednesday, August 27, 2008

Email to law professors

"Intellectuals and Courage" by Professor John Lachs

Dear Professor ________ (I apologize for dispensing with individualized salutation and for not taking the time to type your last name as I have done previously),

I would be interested in any comment you would have about the above essay by Professor John Lachs, a professor of philosophy at Vanderbilt University (which essay you can find at this link "Intellectuals and Courage"). I find the essay to be very a propos of some of the experience I have encountered over the past several years, and I was wondering what you think.

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Sunday, April 20, 2008

Tried this email in March/April

From: RDShatt
To: [previously emailed law professors]
Sent:

Subj: How do you educate judges about plaintiffs' lawyers?

Dear Professor ____________,

In 2004 I endeavored to enlist the expertise of yourself and other tort law professors to enlighten the voting public about plaintiffs' lawyers and tort reform. That was unfortunately not successful. See my blog at D. Law Professors .

Last year I received notice I was a member of the plaintiff class in a class action lawsuit against credit companies and banks related to currency conversion fees in foreign transactions. See In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation. In September I wrote a letter to the judge in the case, one William H. Pauley, III (which letter you can read at Letter to Judge Pauley), in which I said, among other things, he should be ashamed if he puts his stamp of approval on the lawyer shenanigans in the case. The hearing on final approval was scheduled for March 31, 2008.

Progress is slowly being made against plaintiffs' lawyers. It would be nice if being right on a matter of social, legal and economic policy allowed for swifter change, but too many countervailing factors prevent that, and it is simply necessary to keep pushing the right case wherever it can possibly make a difference. In this one, judges can make a difference. I sent my letter to Judge Pauley and I would like to convey a similar message to other judges.

The views of tort law professors (even if limited to issue framing) ought to have some effect with judges and certainly more effect than anything I can say.

If you can offer me any assistance or suggestions in communicating with judges on this subject, I would very much like to hear from you .

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Saturday, March 22, 2008

Enron; Professor John Coffee

Overlawyered.com had this post about the Enron attorneys fees and Professor John Coffee of Columbia being supportive of fee request.

I sent Professor Coffee the following email:

Subj: Enron attorney fees


Dear Professor Coffee,

I saw you referred to and quoted in a March 17, 2008 entry in overlawyered.com as being supportive of the Enron attorney fees request and to the effect that you often testify for fee requests.

Do you have any writings in electronic form that you could send to me, or are there any books or articles you have written not in electronic form that you could cite me to, in which you lay out your positions and arguments relative to tort reform and plaintiffs' lawyers?

For what it is worth, I am squarely in Walter Olson's camp and have my own blog to show for it. I am interested in finding cogent statements of the case on the other side from Mr. Olson and myself, but have not found much yet. I hope you can help me out.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert Shattuck

I discuss Enron is this blog here.

Thursday, November 22, 2007

Back to the law professors

With the publication of "Is Society Serious About Business Ethics?" by The Ethical Spectacle in March 2005 The Ethical Spectacle March 2005, I went back to the law professors with this email:

Dear Professor ____________,

I have received virtually no indication of willingness of tort law professors to participate in a public statement of views regarding tort reform and plaintiffs’ lawyers, whether pro or con, or in a neutral way. Two tort law professors said they would be interested in signing a letter to The Wall Street Journal such as I drafted. Several tort law professors who disagreed with me were summarily dismissive of me, and no professors who disagreed were receptive to a solicitation to work with me in the preparation and submission of an oppositional or alternative statement of position on this subject that is high on the national political agenda.

As a result, I have shifted my angle of approach on the subject to an article I have written entitled “Is U.S. Society Serious About Business Ethics?” I am circulating the article to business ethics publications and to professors of business ethics at business schools. My article has been published online at http://www.spectacle.org/0305/shatt.html by a publication called The Ethical Spectacle.

Perhaps this new angle of mine will engender more commentary by academic experts than I have been able to elicit thus far.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert Shattuck

Wednesday, November 21, 2007

I temporarily suspended with the law professors

With only two or three professors expressing a willingness to actually participate and sign a letter to be submitted to The Wall Street Journal, I suspended my pursuit of my "position" letter idea.

Saturday, November 17, 2007

Second round of emailing to law professors

Dear Professor ______,

I am writing in follow up to the email I previously sent you re: John Edwards and plaintiffs' lawyers.

I have contacted The Wall Street Journal to inquire whether it would be interested in publishing an anti-plaintiffs' lawyers letter that is signed by law school tort law professors. The Wall Street Journal has not yet responded to me about this idea. Pending hearing from the Journal, I have done a draft of an anti-plaintiffs' lawyers letter that I would like to solicit tort law professors to sign.

The text of my draft letter to The Wall Street Journal is appended below.

If you would have an interest in participating in this project and signing a letter, along with other tort law professors, for publication in The Wall Street Journal, please read the draft letter to the Journal appended below and advise me of any suggestions or comments you have for the letter.

I have tried to make the draft letter to The Wall Street Journal as a summary form statement of the case against plaintiffs' lawyers that I set out at greater length in my prior email to you (or, if not, I set it out again by appending it below after the draft letter to The Wall Street Journal below).

In considering the case against plaintiffs' lawyers, I think Walter Olson's recent book The Rule of Lawyers to be a superb book length statement of that case, and also his website http://www.overlawyered.com/ is an excellent resource.

Please let me hear from you if you are interested in participating and signing, along with other tort law professors, a letter to The Wall Street Journal for publication.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Shattuck

[text of draft letter to The Wall Street Journal]

Dear Sir:

For more than a quarter century, there has been growing controversy about the role of plaintiffs' lawyers in the United States. The John Edwards candidacy in the 2004 presidential election affords an unprecedented opportunity to raise the public's consciousness about this controversy. The undersigned are law professors in the United States who teach tort law and who wish to express, in a public manner, shared views they have on the subject, for whatever benefit that will provide the lay public.

We believe that problems exist regarding plaintiffs' lawyers, and that the starting place is to "follow the money."

It appears to us that the compensation that plaintiffs' lawyers receive is not subject to reasonable external constraints of either being determined in a regular competitive labor marketplace or else being accountable to voters and taxpayers. Instead, the compensation of plaintiffs' lawyers is derived as a result of decisions of judges and juries who are not spending their own money in awarding the compensation, and this, it seems to us, has resulted in significant unmindfulness about what is reasonable and appropriate compensation for plaintiffs' lawyers.

A telling example of this has been the national tobacco settlements entered into in the late 1990's. Under these settlements, there are over $100 billion in payments being made among the affected parties, consisting of the tobacco companies, their customers, and state governments. For their work in the settlements, the plaintiffs' lawyers are being paid over $10 billion, at a per hour rate of compensation that can be only guessed at, but $10,000 an hour is probably not too high, and some estimates have been as high as $90,000 per hour. The tobacco settlements effectively implement a national tobacco policy, including essentially built in cigarette taxes on customers on a going forward basis to be the main source of the payments. Compare the tobacco settlements to the work of Congress and state legislatures that adopt huge governmental budgets and enact laws and governmental programs that impose economic costs and taxes amounting to tens and hundreds of billions of dollars. Congressmen and state legislators, subject to voter/taxpayer oversight, are paid relatively modest salaries, and they not are paid huge amounts, such as a percentage of the dollars affected by their budgetary and other legislative actions. When the work that Congressmen and state legislators do, and the compensation they receive for their work, are compared to the tobacco settlement work the plaintiffs' lawyers did and their compensation from the settlements, one gets a good beginning sense that something is amiss with the compensation of plaintiffs' lawyers.

Much of the work that plaintiffs' lawyers do is similar to work of government policy makers, regulators, investigators, prosecutors and program administrators. These government employees are paid reasonable compensation that is determined under the regular operation of a competitive labor marketplace. In the case of plaintiffs' lawyers, we think it can be discerned in thousands, if not tens of thousands, of legal cases and settlements annually, that plaintiffs' lawyers are receiving very excessive compensation for the work they do. We think this is extremely excessive compensation because of an absence of a regularly operating labor marketplace and because of no accountability to taxpayers/voters, and because judges and juries, who are not spending their own money, exercise no reasonable mindfulness about the compensation that their actions award to plaintiffs' lawyers.

In a situation where compensation is excessive because it is being obtained free from any reasonable and meaningful external constraints and supervision, many deleterious consequences can and frequently flow as a result of human nature. Where there is lacking accountability for compensation, and there are not external constraints, blinding greed can take over in the minds of the recipients, and their overriding goal can become solely the huge compensation, and how to increase the huge compensation, and important societal interests will be disregarded.

It seems to us that this has happened in a number of ways in the domain of the plaintiffs' lawyers.

The plaintiffs' lawyers have sought and obtained a tremendous expansion of their domain, in order to achieve correspondingly great increase in their compensation, with little or no regard of whether society's interest is well or ill served by the expansion. As exemplified by the national tobacco settlements, the plaintiffs' lawyers have sought expansion of their domain by usurping the functions of the legislative branch and by bringing within their purview entire fields of economic, social and tax policy. This allows the plaintiffs' lawyers to apply their legal fee percentage to monetary amounts that are in the tens of billions and hundreds of billions of dollar range. Such usurpation of the functions of the legislative branch, in essence, violates democratic principles under our federal and state constitutions that provide that laws and economic, social and tax policy are supposed to be decided upon and enacted by a democratically elected legislative branch of government. The plaintiffs' lawyers seem to us willing to throw these principles by the wayside in pursuit of the goal of expanding their domain and increasing their unaccountable and unreasonable compensation.

Being unaccountable and with their eyes focused to an excessive degree on the huge legal fees they will receive, the plaintiffs' lawyers do not seem to care what the economic, social and policy decisions are that get implemented in matters they bring within their purview. Their overriding goal is to get policy decisions implemented that give rise to transfers and payments to which the plaintiffs' lawyers can attach their percentage legal fees. Many of these policy decisions would garner little or no support among other members of the society.

Being unaccountable to either a commercial marketplace or to voter/taxpayers who desire their government to be cost effective, the plaintiffs' lawyers are uninterested in cost effectiveness or the application of reasonable cost/benefit principles to the work they carry out if that application would be an impediment to a legal recovery and lessen the amount of compensation they can receive. This has resulted in thousands of ridiculous and outrageous verdicts and legal settlements virtually no one thinks has any defensibility in our legal system.

Because of the huge fees they can earn, plaintiffs' lawyers have a very strong bias in favor of finding and pinning liability on "deep pocket" parties regardless of degree of culpability. This has resulted in significant derogation of principles of justice and fairness that are appropriately sensitive to whether a person's conduct in intentionally wrongful, negligent, or without fault.

In the realm of punitive damages, with the compensation of the plaintiffs' lawyers being based on the amount of punitive damages that get imposed, plaintiffs' lawyers have a financial incentive to seek higher rather than lower punitive damages (unlike criminal prosecutors and government regulators) and this would appear to be an inappropriate incentive that results in injustice being done (when judged against the standards our society applies to prosecutors and regulators who are walled off from such a financial incentive).

With the potential of hundreds of millions of dollars of legal fees being gained for themselves, the plaintiffs' lawyers have no problem in maximizing the use of "junk science" to prevail. The silicon breast implant case is one of the better examples of this.

Most rational human beings place value on uniformity, consistency and fixed standards and guidelines of behavior, but the plaintiffs' lawyers are not interested in those things. They want to be able to affix liability regardless. If a regulatory agency, after lengthy and meticulous consideration, has prescribed that a regulated party follow a specified set of guidelines of behavior, and a defendant has followed them, plaintiffs' lawyers want to have a free reign to get judges and juries to find some additional standard of behavior to subject the defendant to after the fact. Plaintiffs' lawyers want to be able to affix liability on the basis of contradictory behaviors, i.e., liability if the defendant does X (where defendant has done X) and in another case liability for not doing X (where defendant has not done X).

In short, with so much in legal fees to be gained, plaintiffs' lawyers, like other human beings, can be and, we think, have been blinded by greed in going after their monumental legal fees, all to the detriment of societal interests of democracy, cost effectiveness, fairness, justice and rationality. We think this is happening, that the public should be told that it is happening, and that the public should demand that the situation be fixed relative to the very significant harms and risks that plaintiffs' lawyers present and are causing in the United States.

While we strongly believe that the situation regarding plaintiffs' lawyers calls for much in the way of fixing, we are not unmindful that there is a major impediment to the public's obtaining fixes as it deserves. The plaintiffs' lawyers mount a defense of themselves, the expansion of the domain that they have obtained, and their usurping of functions of the legislative branch of government on the grounds that the legislative branch is corrupted and broken and failing to properly perform its legislative functions, and that the plaintiffs' lawyers are needed to step in and provide a fix for the broken legislative branch.

We are sympathetic to the view that the legislative branch is broken and in need of a fix. It may be that our society cannot fix the plaintiffs' lawyers' problem without also providing some fix to the broken legislative branch. We think the citizens should be informed about both sets of problems and that the existence of the plaintiffs' lawyers' problem may be caused in part by the problem of a broken legislative branch. We would encourage the nation's citizens and lawmakers to augment their efforts to fix the plaintiffs' lawyers' problem and the broken legislative branch problem.

Sincerely,

__________________, Professor of Law, _________ University
__________________, Professor of Law, _________ University
__________________, Professor of Law, _________ University
__________________, Professor of Law, _________ University

[end of draft letter to The Wall Street Journal]

My stroke of genius (I thought)

I have a tendency to keep pushing forward, building on what I have done. Not being successful with the emailing I had done to law professors, the idea came to me that I would draft a "position" letter for law professors (who agreed with the letter) to sign for submission to The Wall Street Journal for publication. I had previously seen letters on important issues of the moment (legal, economic, etc.) where professors having expertise on the subject matter jointly signed a "position" letter that was published in The Wall Street Journal. It seemed that, in the 2004 election campaign, tort reform was then such an issue that was meritorious for tort or consititional law professors to express views on.

This led me to this second round of emailing to law professors.

Some professors gave pathetic responses

One said nothing more than this (no salutation, etc.)

You are SOOOOO wrong. But I won't waste my time trying to convince you. Why in the world would you bother trying to sell your ridiculous beliefs to a group of law professors, who know better.


Another emailed me back with:

I can't believe you would expect any reasonable, objective educator to
believe this drivel. I expect you will sing a different tune when you
suffer a catastrophic injury and need the assistance of an attorney.
Kindly remove me from your mailing list....[professor's initials]


A third professor replied:

You are a fool. I can think of a few more major “larcen[ies]” effectuated by the current regime. Never contact me again.



A fourth one said (employing my name truncation in my email address):

Mr. Shatt:

What utter nonsense.


In each case I sent an email back to the professor thanking them for replying.

Some professors engaged with me very reasonably

A professor in Texas wrote me:

Dear Mr. Shattuck,

The most massive tort reforms in Texas history--indeed, perhaps in the history of any state--occurred in the 2003 legislative session in the form of a massive, 64 page pro-defense bill known as HB4. Insurance companies successfully lobbied for a change in the Texas Constitution, voted on by Texas voters, that immunizes one portion of the bill--limits on noneconomic damages--from constitutional scrutiny under the Texas Constitution.

I teach not only Torts law as it has developed in various states, but also focus in Torts II on Texas statutory law, as most of our graduates will practice law in Texas. Torts II encompasses scrutiny of HB4 and the significant changes it has made to Texas Torts law.

Absolutely, I have and will continue to teach students about important reform issues as they impact citizens and businesses across the country.

I look forward to the Cheney/Edwards debates and anticipate that they will prove interesting, particularly as (or if) they touch on the subject of Edwards' practice as a plaintiffs' trial lawyer.

What is the genesis of your interest in the subject? I looked at your profile on the internet, and it states that you are a tax attorney.

Sincerely,


I replied with:

Dear Professor ______,

Thank you very much for your reply.

I retired from the practice of law a year and a half ago. As a citizen, I have strongly believed for a number of years that substantial tort law reform is needed. I am aware that progress is being made, but I think there is still a long way to ago. I have endeavored to articulate the case against plaintiffs' lawyers in my own words and append below two of my past writings. I, like you, think this debate is worthy of getting more in front of the public's consciousness at this time by reason of the Edwards candidacy and I am making various efforts in that regard.

Again, thank you for your reply.

Sincerely,



Another professor wrote me:

Mr. Shattuck –

Thanks you for your email. I have always taught the course as a common law course (to first semester torts students – many of whom need exposure to the institutional context of litigation and the goals of the torts system, as well as the content of the common law) and teach it almost entirely from the Franklin and Rabin casebook (probably one of the leading casebooks used in law schools today). I hope that my students see the study of torts as focused more on classic and durable problems in tort law, rather than on issues relating to 2004 election. Of course, throughout the course I always try to integrate into discussion of the common law many broad issues of contemporary policy importance in the legislative realm – federal preemption, punitive caps, compensation for pain and suffering, the role of the jury, the scope of strict liability and burden shifting – but I do not plan focusing any classroom discussion on hypothetical or pending tort reform legislation. I also do not intend to specifically devote any classroom discussion to the 2004 presidential candidates or their platforms. If a tort reform of some sort does come up (and sometimes students do ask about them), we may discuss consistencies/inconsistencies with common law doctrines and in particular with certain general goals of the tort system, as well as potential effects in incentives and behavior, but I certainly don’t see my role as discussing the merits/demerits of policies that are the subject of a current political campaign. I would welcome any suggestions you might have for coverage or reading materials. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Jim

I got some sharp criticisms from two professors

One professor emailed me back and said:

"As a former defense attorney, I am shocked by your characterization of plaintiffs' attorneys as the fourth headless branch of government. That is simply wrong and a distortion of the legal system. Your premise is simply wrong and mischaracterizes the legal system. Let us stay within the framework that we have and talk about how the legal system works or fails to work properly and not engage in such gross mischaracterizations that will skew any discussion of the topic. I have no urge to participate in such discourse. Sincerely, ___________."

I replied as follows:

"Dear Professor __________,

"Thank you very much for your reply.

"I assume you are familiar with literature and proponents that advance the point of view that an unelected fourth branch of government has come into being in substance, so I will not cite you anything in response to your comments (unless you request the same of me). As a citizen, I have endeavored to articulate the case against plaintiffs' lawyers and append below two of my past writings. I think this debate is worthy of getting more in front of the public's consciousness at this time by reason of the Edwards candidacy and I am making efforts in that regard.

"Again, thank you for your reply.

"Sincerely,"

Another professor emailed me back as follows:

"Robert,

"I am a plaintiff''s oriented torts professor. A quick survey of my scholarship should convince you of this fact. I am also a Kerry/Edwards supporter, partly because of the torts issues.

"So while I am sympathetic to your cause, I am appalled by your e-mail. It is offensive. To suggest that you monitor the materials that I might use to support any of my classes is, frankly, rude and presumptuous, and I worry about your e-mail's effect on my colleagues. If I were you, I would edit your e-mail to stop after your offer to come and present on tort reform topics.

"I spend most of my time in the first year teaching students how to read and analyze cases. You can check out my case book and scholarship to determine my perspective. You might do the same with other torts professors you contact."

I replied to this professor with this:

"Dear Professor ________,

"Thank you for your reply.

"I have written strong opinions on the subject of plaintiffs' lawyers in the past and am, as a citizen, endeavoring to find venues by which the debate can be elevated in the public's consciousness at this time in connection with the Edwards candidacy. Appended below are two of my past writings. If there would be any forum at Emory where debate could be had in front of law students, I would be most interested. Please let me know if you can suggest anything.

"I apologize that my email was offensive to you. I am interested in the arguments and presentations on the various sides of the debate and I wish to argue the side as I see it and necessarily, I guess, against the other side. I suppose that can be viewed as "monitoring", but I should not think it needs to be received as offensive in an academic environment.

"Again, thank you very much for replying.

"Sincerely,"

Then I got verbose with the professors

Dear Professor ____________,

Our society has multi-faceted systems that perform two important functions. These are, first, providing monetary compensation and protection when members of the society suffer economic or physical harm or damage, and, second, regulating the behavior of the members to try to lessen the harm they may cause one another. These multi-faceted systems employ millions of workers who are paid reasonable wages in the labor market place. The systems, to the extent they operate as commercial enterprises, are subject to marketplace demands of being efficient and cost effective. To the extent the systems are governmental, they are created by democratically elected legislatures and are implemented and carried out in ways that are responsive to the wishes of voters/taxpayers at large, and the voters/taxpayers usually want their government to be cost effective.

Plaintiffs' lawyers are actors within these multi-faceted systems. A major and growing societal problem, however, is that plaintiffs' lawyers operate in a realm of the systems that has allowed them to escape the constraints of either the market place or of taxpayer/voter control over the compensation they get paid. . Motivated by enormous greed and power lust, plaintiffs' lawyers have found ways, in their domain, to be untethered from restraints of efficiency and cost effectiveness and the application of rational cost/benefit principles in carrying out what they do, all in order to increase their compensation. Further they are expanding their domain to usurp the legislative branch of government as regards the setting of economic, social and tax policy, all motivated by greed and power lust. This is becoming increasingly costly, damaging and threatening to our society and its institutions.

The John Edwards candidacy on the Democratic ticket should raise the public's consciousness about the damage plaintiffs' lawyers are doing to the country and the risks they pose.

Further, for a long time the United States legal profession and the legislatures, judges, regulatory agencies and criminal law apparatus have failed in an obligation to advise the body politic adequately about what plaintiffs' lawyers are doing. The Edwards candidacy offers an unprecedented opportunity to try to rectify that failure.

I hope you will employ your stature and expertise as a law school torts law professor to raise the public's consciousness about these matters during the 2004 presidential campaign.

I. SOCIETY'S SYSTEMS AND APPARATUS FOR LOSS
COMPENSATION AND FOR THE REGULATION
OF HARMFUL BEHAVIOR

As stated, the plaintiffs' lawyers are actors in society's multi-faceted systems that, first, make transfers of money to members of society when they suffer losses or harms, and that, second, seek to regulate behavior and punish, in the name of deterrence, persons whose actions cause damage to others. An appreciation of the reprehensible and deleterious activity of plaintiffs' lawyers requires considering a number of aspects of society's systems of loss compensation and behavior regulation.

A civil society rightfully seeks and places great importance on mechanisms for compensating its members in situations where they suffer physical and economic harms and losses.

The body politic also rightfully seeks and places great importance on the regulation of the activities of its members to lessen harms the members may do to one another and on achieving a deterrent effect by punishing those whose deliberate or negligent actions cause damage to others.

The variety of mechanisms for providing compensation to persons who experience losses include private insurance, welfare programs, natural disaster relief, charities and the civil law liability system.

Under these systems, no payments are "free," and all the payments to compensate for a person's loss come out of someone's pocket. The range of sources of payments includes private insurance premiums, taxes paid to the government, gifts made to charities, and higher prices for goods and services so businesses can cover the liabilities that are imposed on them, or lower wages for employees of the businesses or reduced profits for their owners.

Further, economic resources are scarce, not all losses can be fully compensated to the extent a caring society would wish, and society is sometimes confronted with an extraordinarily complex (and frequently heart wrenching) task of deciding who should get compensated how much for what losses and from what source of payment. Examples are innumerable. Soldiers are asked to give up their lives for their country or suffer grievous injuries and for whom the government must decide how much tax moneys should be provided in the way of compensation. Yearly tens of thousands of mothers and fathers die of cancer and other diseases, leaving children deprived of needed financial resources and critical elements of a nurturing family environment; and society must find ways to address losses these families suffer. Tens of thousands of people are killed annually on the nation's highways, the extent and cost of disabling injuries can only be guessed at, and society must have ways to provide some remedial compensation. Other losses for which society can well wish to provide compensation result from natural disasters, other accidents, potentially beneficial medical procedures, physical and economic crimes, dishonest commercial dealings, drug, alcohol and gambling addictions, extreme social and educational deprivation, mental illnesses, and environmental pollution. Society cannot come anywhere close to making everyone entirely whole for all their losses, and a caring society will want to be judicious in allocating the scarce resources that are available among all the potentially deserving recipients of compensatory payments.

Private insurance works to protect citizens from losses by means of their paying premiums to insurance companies that, in turn, pay money out to insureds who have the misfortune of suffering an insured loss. There are costs in the administration of private insurance that include many employees involved in claims processing (clerical personnel, claims adjusters, investigators, etc.), not to mention battalions of salesmen trying to persuade customers that insurance protection is wise and the insurance offered by the salesman is better than another product. By reason of the regular operation of the labor marketplace, the employees in the insurance industry receive reasonable and justifiable compensation for their work in the implementation of a private insurance system whose object is to make transfers of money as described.

Private insurance maximizes freedom of choice of individuals to decide what losses they want to insure against, and for how much, and what level of premiums they are willing to pay to be covered. If a person wants to protect his family in the event of his death and thinks $10,000,000 is needed, he can buy that amount of life insurance and pay the $50,000 a year premium it takes to buy that much insurance. If a $10,000,000 death benefit is going to be paid, it has got to come out of someone's pocket, and the insured is paying very substantial premiums into the pool of funds needed to make the payment.

In the realm of government welfare programs (including natural disaster relief), society, through its democratically elected representatives, decides when some people who experience harms or are needy for various reasons should have transferred to them money that comes out of taxes collected from the citizenry at large. Democratically elected legislatures that are accountable to all the voters determine the circumstances and amounts to be paid. The governmental programs they create employ many workers, at modest salaries, to determine who qualifies for welfare and other aid and to make and monitor payments. Because the programs cost taxpayers money, and because people do not like to pay taxes, pressures are present to keep costs down, including costs of administration.

Private charities contribute tens of billions of dollars to helping people who suffer loss or harm and need help. The charities cannot remedy all of society's ills and charities judiciously allocate their funds among a myriad of worthy causes.

Society's two parallel systems of the criminal law system and the governmental regulatory system mete out penalties of jail sentences and fines to try to deter citizens from doing things that cause damage to other members of society. The governmental regulatory system includes forcing companies to pay for things like environmental clean up or back pay to employees where there has been unlawful discrimination in the workplace. This regulation can involve substantial amounts of money, and companies, which are trying to operate profitable businesses for their stockholders and employees, will resist making the payments.

In these two parallel systems, there are employed hundreds of thousands of police and other law enforcement agents, lawyers, prosecutors, investigators, scientists, researchers, accountants, legislators, judges and other administrative and clerical personnel. These workers first write the criminal laws and governmental regulations that intimately affect both personal freedoms and trillions of dollars of economic commerce. Ongoing policy debate transpires among democratically elected legislative bodies, government regulators, the regulated parties, and affected citizens as to what is cost effective in terms of the costs involved to achieve various levels of safety or protection in the environment, in consumer products, and in the workplace. There are those who advocate that very high levels of costs should be paid in order to achieve very small incremental improvements in the level of safety or protection, say, against the presence of cancer causing agents in a pesticide (e.g., one part per one hundred million is not acceptable and it must be one part per billion). Creative ideas get proposed, such as allowing rights to pollute the air to be bought and sold in order to achieve the best cost/benefit results, and some people are appalled by such a notion. Many consumers argue that the regulators are too lax, and industry frequently thinks the regulators are too strict.

These employees also carry out the wide range of activities needed to enforce the law and regulations, including investigating whether violations may have occurred. conducting tribunals to make legal determinations as to whether violations have in fact occurred, and determining and administering sanctions.

The armies of workers who toil in these arenas, under the economic laws of supply and demand, do so for reasonable wages. Tops might be $175,000 a year for a senior government lawyer.

When it comes to regulating the activities of society's members and meting out, in the name of deterrence, monetary fines and jail sentences as punishments, society thinks that, in addition to the judge being a neutral party, it would be wrong for the regulators or criminal prosecutors to be paid according to how much in fines they collect or how much jail time they get people sentenced for. Also, regulatory fines do not go into private pockets but rather into the government's coffers and are available for carrying out its regulatory activities.


II. CLOSER LOOK AT THE PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS

Let us now consider the role plaintiffs' lawyers play in these systems in a particular context, say that of automobile accidents.

Somewhere in the range of fifty thousand people a year are killed; the extent of non-fatal injuries and economic losses growing out of car accidents can only be guessed at. For discussion purposes, put annual aggregate losses at $150 billion (which has a semblance of rationality if the value of a human life is put at $1,000,000 as an approximation of the amount an average person would earn over twenty or twenty five years, which would put the loss of life component of the total loss in the range of $50 billion).

This $150 billion annual amount of losses from car accidents alone is a significant nut to crack for society's mechanisms for making transfers of money and punishing people to deter undesired behavior. A large part of the loss will be covered under private life, medical and property insurance (paid for out of insurance premiums paid by all insureds). Many billions of dollars of the total loss likely goes without any compensation.

On the criminal law and regulatory fronts, the police and the courts try to reduce the amount of drunk driving that goes on in the country, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration spends substantial amounts budgeted to it by Congress in carrying out extensive regulatory activities to try to improve car and highway safety.

Then come the plaintiffs' lawyers -- the ones who get a judge and jury to extract $100,000,000 from an automobile company regarding, for example, an accident involving a vehicle whose fuel tanks arguably could have been mounted in an overall safer way (but maybe not, the safety of the totality of the engineering involved being a bit complex to evaluate intelligently), plus possibly a drunk driver plaintiff who was the most to blame for the accident. For his work, the trial lawyer gets to keep, say, $33,000,000, at an effective rate of compensation of, say, $15,000 per hour of work.

That $33,000,000 eventually comes out of higher prices for cars or lower wages for auto industry employees or lower returns to pension funds owning stock in the company's stock. People who do not like paying taxes for welfare programs should also object if they are being nicked by higher car prices or lower wages or reduced stock returns in their 401(k) retirement plan, in order for plaintiffs' lawyers to be compensated at the rate of $15,000 per hour.

Looked at another way, $33 million could pay for a lot of services of legislators, government lawyers, investigators, judges, and other regulatory bureaucrats, working for reasonable compensation, who are engaged in the serious business of designing and administering the criminal law system and the governmental regulatory system that endeavors to get persons (including automobile manufacturers) not to do things (including building unsafe cars) that damage other members of society.

The key question here is whether the $33,000,000 is reasonable compensation for the services performed by the plaintiffs' lawyers, either on the basis that it is determined in the regular operation of a labor market place (as results in reasonable wages for the other millions of workers in the arena) or under the constraints of being responsive to taxpayer and voter control of the compensation paid to public officials (as is the case with legislators and elected executive branch officers). The answer would seem to be clearly, no, the compensation to plaintiffs' lawyers is not reasonable (the way everyone else's compensation is reasonable) and is outrageously excessive.

The plaintiffs' lawyers will reply that it is all a free market economy, and, if entertainers and sports stars can command stratospheric levels of compensation under free and open competition of public performers, then, by the same free market principles, the plaintiffs' lawyers deserve whatever they can obtain by way of what they do in the legal system, it being open to all lawyers to compete there and bid down legal fees if legal fees are too high.

There is a telling difference. People who, by the millions, shell out $50 or $100 of their hard earned money (or their parents' hard earned money) for a ticket to a basketball game or a rock concert do so because of the pleasure they derive from attendance, and, in terms of alternative uses of their money, they choose to buy the ticket as opposed to use for another purpose. That being the case, one is able (perhaps reluctantly) to accept the ungodly amounts received by sports and rock stars who provide the desired pleasurable experience better than anyone else.

The plaintiffs' lawyers, on the other hand, operate in the legal system where the pay they receive is decided by judges and juries who are not spending their own money, who do not think in terms of alternative use for the money, and who act as if the money is not coming out of anyone's pocket. This mentality results in mindless verdicts, and the plaintiff, who stands to have bestowed on him stupendous fortune growing out of his misfortune, is not going to quibble about the prospect of $33,000,000 out of $100,000,000 going to the trial lawyer, the guy who makes it all happen.

The plaintiffs' lawyers, in recent years, have significantly ratcheted up the outrageous compensation they receive by usurping the functions of the legislative branch and by bringing within their purview entire fields of economic, social and tax policy. This allows them to be able to apply their legal fee percentage to monetary amounts that are in the tens of billions and hundreds of billions of dollar range. The most reprehensible example of this to date is the national tobacco settlements entered into in the late 1990's. Society, through its political, legislative and legal processes, and subject to constitutional limitations, is entitled to decide, and should decide, as a matter of economic, social and tax policy, the amounts, if any, under all circumstances considered, that should be extracted from the tobacco industry (and the tobacco industry's stockholders, customers and employees), and also the use of the money that is extracted.

If the democratically elected legislative branch made these policy decisions (as are properly in its domain to do), and if the executive branch agencies implemented the legislative program, all concerned would be paid only their reasonable salaries for doing this job on behalf of the citizens.

But, no, not the plaintiffs' lawyers. They shanghai national tobacco policy into their purview, implement national tobacco policy decisions, and turn around and charge the public billions and billions of dollars for their services. This is a larceny against the public of the highest order.

III. THE BANEFUL EFFECTS OF UNCONSTRAINED AND
UNACCOUNTABLE GREED OF PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS

Once it has been discerned and determined that plaintiffs' lawyers have untethered their compensation from the constraints of the marketplace and also from the constraints of taxpayer/voter control, and that they are basically unaccountable for what they do, many very deleterious consequences flow as a result of human nature.

First, the plaintiffs' lawyers seek to expand their domain regardless of whether society's interest is well or ill served by the expansion. As in the tobacco settlements that are a usurpation of the legislative function, the plaintiffs' lawyers give no consideration as to whether the expansion is wrongful or unconstitutional under the three branches of government that are established by the constitution and whether there is a violation of the principle of separation of powers by reason of the plaintiffs' lawyers having usurped the legislative function. For the plaintiffs' lawyers, the expansion is motivated solely by the tens of billions of dollars of increased compensation to them that will result from the expansion.

Further, being unaccountable and with their eyes focused solely on the huge legal fees they will receive, the plaintiffs' lawyers do not particularly care what the economic, social and policy decisions are that get implemented in matters they bring within their purview. Their only goal is to get policy decisions implemented that give rise to transfers and payments to which the plaintiffs' lawyers can attach their percentage legal fees.

Second, the plaintiffs' lawyers are uninterested in the application of reasonable cost/benefit principles to the work they carry out if that application would be an impediment to a legal recovery and lessen the amount of compensation they can receive. Just about everywhere one turns in the world, one finds human beings trying to utilize cost/benefit principles to make decisions and carry out action. The plaintiffs' lawyers will do everything they can to exclude cost/benefit principles if they are an impediment to winning a lawsuit and giving them their percentage legal fee. This has resulted in thousands of completely absurd, ridiculous and outrageous verdicts and legal settlements.

In the realm of punitive damages, with the compensation of the plaintiffs' lawyers being based on the amount of punitive damages that get imposed, plaintiffs' lawyers have a financial incentive to seek higher rather than lower punitive damages (unlike criminal prosecutors and regulators) and this incentive severely risks plaintiffs' lawyers being improperly influenced in the amount of punitive damages they seek (when judged against the standards our society applies to prosecutors and regulators who are walled off from such a financial incentive).

With the potential of hundreds of millions of dollars of legal fees being gained for themselves, the plaintiffs' lawyers have no problem in maximizing the use of "junk science" to prevail. The silicon breast implant case is one of the better examples of this.

In short, with so much in legal fees to be gained, plaintiffs' lawyers, like any other human being, can be and are blinded by stupendous greed in going after their monumental legal fees, all to the great detriment of societal interests of democracy, cost effectiveness and fairness.

IV. FAILURES OF RESPONSIBLE PARTIES TO ADVISE BODY POLITIC

A couple of years ago, a civil jury in Hale County, Alabama, awarded $500,000,000 in punitive damages to three plaintiffs who were lied to by Whirlpool Corporation to the effect that the plaintiffs would have to make payments for about three years for a satellite dish, which would total roughly $1000, where in fact the contract called for payments for about 4-1/2 years totaling about $1600, or, in other words the plaintiffs were to be cheated out of $600 from what they were told.

There should be no doubt that the job of the state legislature in Alabama (or any other state) and of the state's regulatory agencies and its criminal law system includes or should include endeavoring to protect their citizens from Whirlpool lying to customers and cheating them out of $600.

One conclusion that one might arrive at is that, if it is needed for the state of Alabama to resort to a $500,000,000 punitive damage verdict against Whirlpool in order to protect Alabama citizens, there has been an abominable failure of the Alabama legislature, regulatory agencies and criminal law apparatus in doing their job of regulating Whirlpool's activities and imposing fines and jail sentences to deter Whirlpool from doing what it did. A $500,000,000 punitive damages verdict is ludicrous and preposterous overkill, which, if applied in a commensurate way to every other big and small dishonest commercial dealing would result in the bankruptcy of the entirety

Before resorting to that kind of preposterous overkill, it might behoove the citizens of Alabama first to make a wholesale eviction from office of the incumbent legislature, regulatory agencies, and criminal law apparatus, and replace them with a new set of legislators, regulators, prosecutors and judges to see if the new group could do better in dealing with Whirlpool so that a $500,0000,000 punitive damage verdict can be foregone. Further, if new officials are not successful and it is concluded that such a penalty is ultimately needed, hopefully the new officials would have the sense to arrange for the penalty to be paid into the state's coffers and be available to support regulatory efforts generally for the benefit all Alabama citizens, instead of allowing the penalty to be poured into the pockets of three private plaintiffs and their attorneys.

The possibility needs to be recognized, however, that there has not been such an egregious job failure on the part of the legislature, regulators and criminal law system as is suggested above. Conceivably it is a sham argument that $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts are needed as a result of failure by the legislature, regulatory agencies and criminal law apparatus in regulating the activities of society's members and meting out punishments for deterrent purposes. The argument may be a pretense to distract from something else that is going on with $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts. The truth of the matter may be that the civil liability system has been shanghaied by a bunch of greedy lawyers who are running it for the purpose of enriching themselves, and $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts are reflective only of how successful they have been in achieving their objective, and not at all reflective of a need society has as a result of any egregious and irremediable failure of the regulatory agencies and criminal law apparatus.

The problem is that, if this alternative explanation of things is correct, and if the first suggested job failure is not so egregious as suggested, then the legislators, regulators, prosecutors, and judges are guilty of a second failure that would be equally deserving of condemnation. This second failure would be the failure to stand up and defend themselves, and say the truth of the matter, to wit, that the regulatory regime and criminal law apparatus are not so deficient, the argument that they are irremediably deficient to such a degree that $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts are needed is a sham and subterfuge, a bunch of greedy lawyers has hijacked the civil law liability system for their own enrichment, and that system needs to be reclaimed by and for the people in order for it to serve properly society's legitimate goals of judiciously providing compensation for losses that citizens suffer and punishing in a reasonable way intentional or negligent harming of others.

A further possibility here is that Alabama's legislators, regulators, prosecutors and judges do not understand sufficiently what is black and white as described above and may not know of the pretense argument being made by the lawyers who have hijacked the civil liability system. If there is a lack of understanding, a partial excuse would exist for those officials failing to stand up in their own defense and failing to tell the public the truth about what is really going on.

Such a partial excuse would, however, point to perhaps an even worse failing, which would be that of the legal profession as a whole. That profession is best trained to know and understand what is black and white as describe above, to examine whether significant deficiencies in the regulatory and criminal law systems exist, to evaluate whether any inadequacies are so substantial and irremediable that alternative means must be found to regulate and to mete out punishments, to decide whether $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts are needed, and to reach conclusions about whether the civil liability system has been hijacked by greedy lawyers who are running it to enrich themselves and to the detriment of serving society's purposes. Surely the legal profession's obligations to society at large would include informing the legislatures, regulators, prosecutors and judges about such matters. This would be particularly so if those officials lack an adequate understanding of things, and thus are not able to state their own defense against the hijacking lawyers who would assert that $500,000,000 punitive damage verdicts are needed, and further are not able to find the way to seize back the hijacked civil liability system from those lawyers so that the system can serve the citizens the way it should. For the legal profession not to fulfill such an obligation would seem the worst failing of all those considered here.

V. SUMMATION

Society has a serious interest in its mechanisms of providing compensation and monetary protection when members of the society experience economic or bodily injury and loss and also has a serious interest in its criminal and regulatory law apparatus for regulating behavior to lessen harm and injury. The systems are broad based and multi-faceted and are constrained to operate in reasonable, democratic, judicious and economically efficient and cost effective ways. The workers in the systems toil for reasonable wages that are established in the regular operation of the labor marketplace or as the elected servants of the taxpayers who can remove them from office if the servants try to pay themselves too much money.

That is, all except for the plaintiffs' lawyers operating in their domain. Plaintiffs' lawyers operate in a realm of the systems that has allowed them to escape the constraints of either the market place or of taxpayer/voter control over the compensation they get paid. . Motivated by enormous greed and power lust, plaintiffs' lawyers have found ways, in their domain, to be untethered from restraints of efficiency and cost effectiveness and the application of rational cost/benefit principles in carrying out what they do, all in order to increase the amount of percentage legal fees they receive. Further plaintiffs' lawyers are expanding their domain to usurp the legislative branch of government as regards the setting of economic, social and tax policy, all motivated by greed and power lust. This is becoming increasingly costly, damaging and threatening to our society and its institutions.

The most serious threat and risk of the plaintiff's lawyers is their usurpation of the legislative branch function, as exemplified by the tobacco settlements, where the plaintiffs' lawyers scoop within their purview that which in substance is economic, social, and tax legislation and policy, all in order that there get set up stupendous amounts of monetary transfers to which the plaintiffs lawyers percentage legal fees can get attached. Legislators adopt and implement multi-billion dollar budgets and affect tens of billions of dollars of economic commerce through the laws they adopt, but the legislators do not get paid based on a percentage of those billions of dollars. Plaintiffs' lawyers implement things like a national tobacco policy through the national tobacco settlements, and claim more than ten billion dollars of legal fees as a percentage of more than one hundred billion dollars that their settlements determine are to be transferred among parties. This is monumental larceny of the taxpayers and puts the nation at risk of having significant economic, social and tax policy being determined and implemented by plaintiffs' lawyers who are not accountable to anyone for what they do and are blinded in what they do by their greed.

The legal profession, legislatures, judges, regulatory bodies and the criminal law apparatus have failed collectively to inform the body politic about what the plaintiffs' lawyers are perpetrating in the United States.

The John Edwards candidacy is an unprecedented opportunity to raise the public's consciousness about the harm that the plaintiffs' lawyers are doing to our society and to rectify the failures of the other mentioned parties to inform the body politic about this immense harm and risk.

I hope you will employ your stature and expertise as a law school torts law professor to raise the public's consciousness about these matters during the 2004 presidential campaign.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Friday, November 16, 2007

Constitutional law professors

I also sent a similar email to constitutional law professors, except that it contained a provocative characterization. Here is the form of what I sent to them.

"Dear Professor __________,

"The candidacy of John Edwards offers the potential of significantly elevating during the election campaign the public's consciousness about plaintiffs' lawyers as an alleged unelected and unconstitutional Fourth Branch of government.

"I hope your constitutional law class this fall will be commensurate in exploring for the benefit of your students the important question of whether and/or the extent to which plaintiffs' lawyers (and cohort judges and sometimes cohort state attorney generals) have usurped legislative branch functions of our federal and state governments.

"I personally, if you were so inclined, would be interested in engaging you in email dialogue on the subject. I would like to learn what source or lecture materials you might utilize for this topic and even what the content of your lectures related to this might be.

"I look forward to any response you give to this email.

"Thank you very much.

"Very truly yours,"