Showing posts with label M. Archive. Show all posts
Showing posts with label M. Archive. Show all posts

Thursday, October 27, 2011

WSJ: Citigroup mortgage fraud settlement

  • The Wall Street Journal

Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle Fraud Charges


Wall Street's total price tag on settlements with U.S. securities regulators for allegedly misleading investors about mortgage bonds churned out ahead of the financial crisis surged past $1 billion with a deal by Citigroup Inc. to pay $285 million.
The New York company agreed to the payment to end civil-fraud charges by the Securities and Exchange Commission related to a 2007 deal called Class V Funding III. The SEC claimed Citigroup sold slices of the $1 billion mortgage-bond deal without disclosing to investors that the bank was shorting $500 million of the deal, or betting its assets would lose value.
Several Wall Street firms have settled similar claims by the SEC, which has generally stuck to the strategy used by the agency to get a $550 million settlement last year with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. over a collateralized debt obligation called Abacus 2007-AC1.
And the SEC's investigation of the Wall Street mortgage machine isn't over yet. Lorin Reisner, deputy enforcement director at the SEC, said civil mortgage-related cases against Goldman, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Countrywide Financial Corp., New Century Financial Corp. and other companies "read like an index to unlawful conduct in connection with the financial crisis." He added in an email: "Our work in this space is continuing."
As a result of the deal with Citigroup announced Wednesday, the SEC has collected a total of $1.03 billion through mortgage-bond-deal settlements. In addition to Citigroup, the total includes Goldman, J.P. Morgan, Royal Bank of Canada, Wells Fargo & Co. and Credit Suisse Group AG.
The companies neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing.According to the SEC, Citigroup helped to rig the bet on Class V Funding III in its favor by exercising "significant influence" over the selection of $500 million of the assets, according to the agency's civil complaint. The agency said investors were assured that the assets were selected by the deal's collateral manager, a unit of Credit Suisse.The assets in the deal, a CDO, were linked largely to other CDOs that in turn invested in pools of subprime mortgages. The SEC complaint quoted one unnamed, experienced CDO trader outside Citi who described the portfolio as "a collection of "dogs—" and "possibly the best short EVER!"The deal became largely worthless within months of its creation, the SEC said. As a result, about 15 hedge funds, investment managers and other firms that invested in the deal lost hundreds of millions of dollars, while Citigroup made $160 million in fees and trading profits, the SEC said.The biggest loser, with a $500 million stake from guarantees sold on the deal, was insurer Ambac, part of Ambac Financial Group Inc., which collapsed because of its exposure to billions of dollars of mortgage-linked investments that went sour, according to the SEC.The assets that Citigroup helped to select performed "significantly worse" than others in the CDO, according to the SEC's complaint.
Citigroup said Wednesday that it suffered some losses on more than $100 million invested by the company in Class V Funding III, while profiting from its bet against $500 million of the portfolio. Citigroup added that it had "very substantial losses" on investments in other CDOs.
Citigroup said it was pleased to resolve the matter. The SEC also filed civil charges of negligence against Brian Stoker, referred to by the agency as the Citigroup employee primarily responsible for structuring the CDO. The SEC alleged that Mr. Stoker described Class V Funding III as a "prop," or proprietary deal, meaning a trade undertaken for the firm's own account, rather than to benefit its customers.
The SEC complaint quoted from an email Mr. Stoker allegedly sent to his supervisor as the deal was being discussed in November 2006, writing that Credit Suisse "agreed to terms even though they don't get to pick the assets."
Mr. Stoker's lawyer, Fraser Hunter of law firm Wilmer Hale Cutler Pickering Hale Dorr LLP, said there was "no basis for the SEC to blame" his client for the alleged disclosure failures to investors. "He was not responsible for any alleged wrongdoing, he did not control or trade the position, did not prepare the disclosures and did not select the assets," Mr. Hunter said. "We will vigorously defend this lawsuit."
If it goes to trial, Mr. Hunter's case is due to be heard by U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff. Judge Rakoff, who also must approve the Citigroup agreement, has previously criticized the SEC's approach to certain enforcement actions.
Credit Suisse agreed to pay a total of $2.5 million to settle civil charges in relation to the CDO. It didn't admit or deny wrongdoing. The Swiss bank doesn't expect to face enforcement action from the SEC in relation to CDOs that it created or marketed, according to a person familiar with the matter. A spokesman for Credit Suisse declined to comment.
The SEC also filed civil-fraud charges against Samir Bhatt, a former Credit Suisse employee. Mr. Bhatt agreed to a six-month suspension from associating with any investment adviser, as part of an agreement to settle the charges. He didn't admit or deny wrongdoing. Mr. Bhatt's lawyer, James Masella of law firm Blank Rome LLP, declined to comment.

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

WSJ: Bank of New York currency probe

  • The Wall Street Journal
  • OCTOBER 12, 2011

Secret Informant Surfaces in BNY Currency Probe

For a decade, Grant Wilson toiled on a small trading desk at Bank of New York Mellon Corp. in Pittsburgh, buying and selling currencies for the bank's biggest clients.
Mr. Wilson also had another job: For the last two of those years he was a secret whistleblower, assisting currency-trading investigations of BNY Mellon, according to people familiar with the matter.
A secret whistleblower, Grant Wilson, is at the heart of allegations that BNY Mellon overcharged clients on billions of dollars of currency trades.
His input culminated with the filing last week of separate civil lawsuits by the Justice Department in federal court and New York attorney general in state court alleging that BNY Mellon systematically overcharged investors on billions of dollars of currency trades, defrauding or misleading them for a decade.
The suits seek a total of more than $2 billion from the bank. BNY Mellon denies wrongdoing and is fighting the legal actions.
The allegations against BNY Mellon represent one of the broadest enforcement efforts ever against banks that trade in global currencies—one of the world's biggest financial marketplaces. Massive pension funds that oversee hundreds of billions of dollars for teachers, police and firemen and retirees now are questioning whether they got a fair shake on currency transactions that generated profits for the banks.
Until now, Mr. Wilson's identity remained a closely kept secret. His role as a lone whistleblower against BNY Mellon went undetected even as the bank's lawyers looked for a whistleblower.
The Justice Department and New York's attorney general filed separate civil lawsuits against Bank of New York Mellon Corp. alleging that the bank fraudulently charged clients for currency transactions, David Reilly reports on Markets Hub. Photo: Getty Images.
He left the bank this year after providing information and documents that helped the government and a whistleblower legal group. To pull off two years of secrecy, he and his legal team used a shell partnership in Delaware, met on a Saturday so Mr. Wilson wouldn't be missed at the office, and talked strategy at anonymous restaurants.
 
Mr. Wilson, along with two lawyers and two other whistleblowers in a separate case, are part of a group that includes Harry Markopolos—the fraud investigator best known for his early, and correct, suspicions that Bernard Madoff's multibillion-dollar investment empire was a fraud. Mr. Markopolos says his group's currency-trading allegations have roots in a hunch he had in 2006 that currency-trading costs might be causing unusual gaps in investment returns.
The group first filed their own lawsuits against the two banks, using information from the whistleblowers, according to people familiar with the matter. State attorneys general then ultimately filed their own lawsuits in four states, believing the whistleblower claims had merit. The whistleblower group can seek a share of as much as 25% of any recovery the states obtain in many of the cases.
State attorneys general in Virginia, Florida and New York and the Justice Department allege BNY Mellon overcharged major clients by giving them unfavorable currency-exchange rates. The alleged fraud involved banking clients that don't negotiate currency trades themselves, but instead give "standing instruction" to a bank to trade for them. These clients usually aren't trading currencies for profit, but simply need foreign money to do transactions overseas.
Mr. Wilson described to his lawyers, and later, law-enforcement officials, how the alleged scheme worked at BNY Mellon and provided internal documents showing the bank's profits. The Wall Street Journal pieced together this account of his role from court documents and extensive interviews with bankers, lawyers and people familiar with the government inquiries.
Mr. Wilson, 52 years old, declined to comment.
In a related case, state prosecutors in California have sued rival State Street Corp., accusing it of improperly pricing currency trades. The Securities and Exchange Commission also is investigating State Street, according to a regulatory filing. State Street strongly denies the allegations.
BNY Mellon sought to discover the insider's identity and to fight the lawsuits. The 225-year-old bank also set up a website to answer client questions and last week ran full-page advertisements in major newspapers saying the claims against it "are flat out wrong and we will fight them in court."
A BNY Mellon spokesman rejected the notion the bank provided "least favorable" currency rates to clients. "We provide competitive wholesale pricing for retail-sized transactions," he said, adding "our clients and their investment managers have full discretion to execute foreign-exchange trades through us or any other provider."
Mr. Wilson, an expert in trading Japanese yen, worked on a BNY Mellon trading desk in Pittsburgh, some 375 miles from the bank's headquarters at One Wall Street in New York. On that desk, the whistleblower—identified by people familiar with the situation as Mr. Wilson—"had extensive personal contact with the employees and executives" behind the alleged fraud, according to the Virginia attorney general's complaint.
According to the Virginia and Florida attorney general suits, a separate "transaction desk" was responsible for collecting the currency trades made for the bank's "standing instruction" clients and then setting the price at which the bank would record those transactions. The prices often were at or near the day's least favorable exchange rates, state attorneys general and prosecutors allege, with the bank profiting from the difference.
State attorneys general allege that emails and internal communications from BNY Mellon show executives endorsing the alleged currency-transaction practice, favoring certain clients with better pricing, and worrying that profit margins would fall if the bank were more transparent. The ability of bank clients to monitor transactions more closely would "reduce margins dramatically," according to an email in Virginia's lawsuit, filed in August in state court.
As the BNY Mellon currency-trading investigations grew, Mr. Wilson's colleagues in the office wondered who the whistleblower might be, according to people familiar with the situation. Mr. Wilson's lawyers gave him language to use if he were ever questioned: He was to refer to himself as a "relator"—a whistleblower, in legal parlance—and say, "I'm pursuing a false-claims case against this company." The explicit language was designed to give Mr. Wilson legal recourse if the company were to retaliate against him for being a whistleblower, these people say.
The investigations focus on an opaque area of the foreign-exchange business, where $4 trillion is traded daily. BNY Mellon and State Street are two of the world's largest "custody" banks, which specialize in processing trades and handling administrative tasks for global money managers including pension funds, corporations, universities and other banks.
Mr. Wilson's decision to become a whistleblower started with Mr. Markopolos, the fraud investigator, who had the 2006 hunch about currency-transaction costs. Over the past four years, he and his legal team contacted Mr. Wilson and two former State Street employees, Peter Cera and Ryan Gagne, to secretly help build cases against the two banks. The whistleblower group is led by two lawyers, Michael Lesser in Boston and Philip Michael in New York.
Working with the legal team, Mr. Markopolos arranged clandestine meetings with the whistleblowers at a shopping center and hotel restaurants. The secrecy paid off. Messrs. Cera and Gagne's names have remained confidential until now. The two former State Street employees declined to comment.
The group organized Delaware partnerships, with the three whistleblowers as the partners, in order to keep their identities out of public view. Messrs. Lesser and Michael are the lawyers for the partnerships. Mr. Markopolos works as a litigation consultant to the lawyers.
The reconstruction of the whistleblower group's formation is based on court documents, obituaries, real-estate records, currency-trading industry materials and the accounts of 10 people familiar with the situation.
Mr. Markopolos's hunch came from a book by Yale University's chief investment officer, in which a description of currency transactions stuck out: "Foreign exchange translations may influence returns in a substantial, unpredictable manner." Mr. Markopolos also noticed that pension funds using outside money managers reported slightly lower returns than the money managers themselves.
He asked a friend who had worked at State Street, who told him that custody banks typically charge pension funds unfavorable foreign-exchange, or FX, prices. The friend told Mr. Markopolos, "No one ever checks FX."
He strategized about how to find bank insiders who could help him look into his suspicions. A key tactic: Looking for traders who might be sympathetic, then cold-calling them and saying, "I have a better job for you."
Working from a small home office in Whitman, Mass., he began to try to contact whistleblowers, including Mr. Cera whom he knew through the Boston securities and banking community. A former senior currency researcher at State Street, he told Mr. Markopolos that allegedly improper currency trading was one reason he had left State Street.
“Mr. Wilson's role went undetected even as the bank's lawyers looked for a whistleblower.”
Mr. Markopolos asked Mr. Cera for another State Street insider. He suggested Mr. Gagne. By this time, Mr. Gagne also had left State Street, where he was a currency salesman and worked with the bank's computer systems. Mr. Gagne eventually agreed to join.
In April 2008, the whistleblower team, using information from Messrs. Cera and Gagne, filed a sealed lawsuit against State Street on behalf of two major pension funds, California State Teachers' Retirement System and the California Public Employees' Retirement System, or Calpers.
The suit was filed by an anonymous Delaware partnership called Associates Against FX Insider Trading. It alleges State Street charged the two California funds unfavorable currency rates, determining the prices between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. each day so the bank could take advantage of daily price fluctuations. The complaint says State Street referred to public pension funds as "dumb" clients compared with "smart" clients who negotiated currency trades to get a better rate.
In a statement, a State Street spokesman said, "Neither Mr. Cera nor Mr. Gagne's job responsibilities included managing or executing indirect FX transactions." She said Mr. Cera left in 2001 and Mr. Gagne left in 2004, well before the 2008 complaint filed in California. She said the bank offers "clients and their investment managers a range of FX execution options and transparency as to our pricing methods" and that the bank will defend against the California allegations.
Meantime, Mr. Markopolos and the legal team contacted Mr. Wilson. Both Messrs. Cera and Wilson had worked at State Street.
On Sept. 12, 2009, Mr. Wilson met with the two lawyers, Messrs. Lesser and Michael, in Boston on a Saturday at Mr. Lesser's firm, Thornton & Naumes. Mr. Wilson didn't take much time away from work and didn't want to raise any suspicions by being out, according to people familiar with the situation.
Mr. Wilson and the lawyers discussed what was at stake during a three-hour meeting. Mr. Wilson claimed that all the standing-instruction trades were made at the same time in the afternoon, according to court documents.
In fall 2009, California's then-attorney general, Jerry Brown, sued State Street in Sacramento state court. In a news release, Mr. Brown cited the whistleblowers's earlier suit and alleged that the bank had charged the state's pension fund at or near the "highest rate of the day." The state estimated that damages and penalties could exceed $200 million.
The State Street lawsuit in California quickly caused headaches over at BNY Mellon. An internal BNY Mellon monthly business report in November 2009 said, "The fallout from the State of California vs. State Street lawsuit continues. To date BNYM has received 42 queries from clients questioning our policies and procedures."
In late October, the whistleblower group finalized suits against BNY Mellon in several states. The group filed papers to form a Delaware general partnership called "FX Analytics" to provide anonymity for Mr. Wilson. They soon filed suits in Virginia, Florida, New York and several other states, according to people familiar with the matter, all of which remain under seal.
The Virginia and Florida filings alleged that BNY Mellon cherry-picked the least-favorable rates for pension funds. Using the whistleblower's information, the suit listed specific amounts of standing-instruction trades—$5.375 billion—that had been processed through a Pittsburgh desk in July 2009. The lawsuits referred to a "relator" who "possesses extensive knowledge and experience regarding (BNY Mellon's) bank offices, businesses and personnel, including personal contact with the employees and executives of BNY Mellon ... who have committed the alleged violations."
The whistleblower suits remained a secret until earlier this year. In January 2011, Virginia Attorney General Kenneth Cuccinelli II intervened and took control of the suit against BNY Mellon in a move that unsealed the 2009 FX Analytics complaint. Florida Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi did the same.
Those moves were the first public indication that someone inside BNY Mellon was aiding litigation against the bank. Inside BNY Mellon, Mr. Wilson feared his role would be revealed. Friends and colleagues openly discussed who the insider might be.
However, Mr. Wilson was never confronted. Earlier this year he told his boss he was retiring. He moved from Pittsburgh to New England in July.
On Aug. 11, Virginia's Mr. Cuccinelli sued BNY Mellon, alleging the bank had given a fake currency-transaction price to Virginia funds on more than 73,000 trades. The complaint said the "relator" was "employed in the FX trading department at (BNY Mellon) in Pittsburgh" and that "the relator observed (BNY Mellon's) FX trading for its custodial clients and learned directly that the FX scheme described herein was orchestrated and demanded by the senior executive staff of the Bank."
Last week, New York's attorney general intervened and filed its own suit, and the Manhattan U.S. attorney's office also filed suit. Both lawsuits kept secret the role Mr. Wilson played.
Write to Carrick Mollenkamp at carrick.mollenkamp@wsj.com

Monday, May 30, 2011

WSJ: Mortgage fraud civil charges against individuals


  • The Wall Street Journal

SEC Eyes Charges For Bond Players

Settlement agreements being hammered out by U.S. securities regulators and securities firms accused of fraud in mortgage-bond deals are likely to include civil charges against at least one person connected to each deal, according to people familiar with the situation.
Securities and Exchange Commission officials are pushing hard as part of their ongoing probe of collateralized debt obligations and other mortgage-related products developed by Wall Street to bring charges against individuals, such as executives involved in selling the deals or outsiders who managed the assets, these people said.
While the situation remains fluid, the agency also could file civil charges against hedge-fund managers who helped structure certain mortgage-bond deals but then bet against them.
The move by the SEC to pin at least some of the blame for alleged wrongdoing on specific individuals follows criticism of the agency for previous fraud settlements in which no enforcement action was taken against executives or other employees.
In 2009, U.S. District Court Judge Jed Rakoff in New York denounced the SEC's proposed $33 million settlement with Bank of America Corp. of civil charges related to its takeover of Merrill Lynch as a "contrivance designed to provide the SEC with the facade of enforcement."
No executives at the Charlotte, N.C., bank were accused of wrongdoing as part of the case. Judge Rakoff eventually agreed "reluctantly" to a $150 million settlement in which Bank of America neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing.
Robert Khuzami, the SEC's director of enforcement, declined to comment on the settlement talks. "Our starting point in any investigation is to see if there are grounds for enforcement action against one or more individuals," he said in an interview.
Financial firms being probed by the SEC include J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Morgan Stanley, Bank of America's Merrill unit and UBS AG, according to people familiar with the matter. The companies declined to comment.
Talks aimed at reaching settlements with at least some of the firms have accelerated in recent weeks. In its quarterly report last week, J.P. Morgan said it was in "advanced discussions" to resolve the matter, though the New York company said it couldn't assure that a deal would be reached.
In January, the SEC notified J.P. Morgan's former head of CDOs, Michael Llodra, and Edward Steffelin, a former executive at an outside firm that managed the assets in a CDO created by the giant bank, that they could face civil charges related to the bond deal called Squared, according to their records at the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
Lawyers for Messrs. Llodra and Steffelin declined to comment.
CDOs are complex pools of mortgages and other loans, made up in part of risky subprime mortgages. Banks and securities firms cranked out more than $1 trillion of CDOs, often at the request of investors who made bets against the same deals. The collapse of the CDO market deepened the financial crisis and triggered investigations of Wall Street's mortgage machine.
In the most significant example, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. agreed to pay $550 million last year to settle an SEC investigation into whether it duped investors in a CDO deal called Abacus 2007-AC1.
Goldman admitted making mistakes but denied cheating clients. No Goldman executives were accused of wrongdoing by the SEC, and the agency is heading to trial against Fabrice Tourre, the Goldman bond trader who helped assemble the Abacus deal. He is fighting the civil fraud charges.
A lawyer for Mr. Tourre declined to comment. A Goldman spokesman declined to comment.
Mr. Steffelin, who worked at investment-management firm GSC Group, was influential in that company's rejection of a request by Goldman to manage the Abacus deal, according to lawmakers who scrutinized the transaction.
A Senate report released last month included an email from February 2007 in which Mr. Steffelin wrote to a Goldman executive: "I do not have to say how bad it is that you guys are pushing this thing." Asked later about the email, sent after GSC had declined to act as a manager for Abacus, Mr. Steffelin said he believed the CDO created "reputational" risk for the market.
As part of a growing push to counter criticism that it hasn't punished enough executives for wrongdoing related to the financial crisis, the SEC launched a new section on its website about the agency's track record.
The SEC has filed charges against 32 senior executives as part of enforcement actions related to the crisis that have resulted in $1.34 billion in penalties and restitution to investors.
"Most of the concern seems to stem from the fact that there have been few senior executives going off to jail as a result of the crisis, though that's not for lack of hard work and dedication on the part of the criminal authorities," Mr. Khuzami said.
"It's a pretty strong track record, and we're still hard at work," he added.

WSJ: Company President charged with homicide


  • The Wall Street Journal

Owning Up to a Boy's Death

Rare but Grisly Swimming Pool Accident Spurs Unusual Prosecution of Executive

Associated Press
Shoreline Pools President David Lionetti, left, and his attorney Richard Meehan in 2008.

David Lionetti's swimming pool company failed to install a required safety device in a Connecticut family's backyard pool. That triggered the drowning of a six-year-old boy, state prosecutors argued, and led to an unusual homicide case against Mr. Lionetti, the company's president.
The prosecution spotlighted a rare but gruesome accident called entrapment, in which powerful suction from a pool's drain traps a swimmer underwater. The case also could pave the way for similar prosecutions.
After the six-year-old, Zachary Cohn, was fatally trapped underwater in 2007 with his arm caught in the pool's drain, Connecticut prosecutors charged Mr. Lionetti, president of Shoreline Pools, of Stamford, with manslaughter.
The prosecutors claimed that the company had failed to install a device that would have shut off the pump when an object got in the way.
Pool-industry experts say the criminal charges against Mr. Lionetti were the first ever lodged against an industry executive for an entrapment injury.
"It was clear that both Lionetti and Shoreline's behavior was to pay lip service to safety regulations," said Ernie Teitell, the Cohns' lawyer in separate civil litigation. "The plea indicates that safety has to be a number one priority."
Mr. Lionetti's lawyer, Richard Meehan, didn't return calls seeking comment. A representative for Shoreline Pools declined to comment. The prosecutors who handled the case didn't return calls requesting comment.
A federal bill was signed into law in 2007, after Zachary drowned, to prevent entrapment in public pools and spas. The Virginia Graeme Baker Act was named after the seven-year-old granddaughter of former Secretary of State James Baker who died in 2002 when suction from a drain trapped her at the bottom of a spa.
In entrapment, swimmers can be pinned to the floor of the pool or otherwise trapped until they drown or suffer serious injuries, including disembowelment. According to statistics gathered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, from 1999 to 2008 there were reports of 83 entrapments nationwide, 11 of which involved fatalities. Small children are especially vulnerable.
Pool makers have made significant improvements in recent years, but safety advocates want them to move faster, and there are gaps in the patchwork of federal and state regulations that govern the pool industry.
The industry, with its main political arm, the Association of Pool & Spa Professionals, has lobbied against tougher rules, safety advocates say.
"They've fought safety efforts every step of the way," said Nancy Baker, the mother of the girl killed in the 2002 accident. "It's always been more about saving money than safety with them."
Carvin DiGiovanni, a senior director with the APSP, said his organization had worked closely with federal lawmakers leading up to the Virginia Graeme Baker Act.
The law requires all public pools and spas to employ special upgraded drain covers to prevent entrapment and, in some instances, to install devices that reduce the water force should an object get stuck in the drain. Violations can bring civil or criminal penalties.
"Safety has always been a core value of the association and remains a core value," said Mr. DiGiovanni.
Write to Ashby Jones at ashby.jones@wsj.com

Sunday, May 15, 2011

WSJ 5/11/11 -U.S. Rebuffed in Glaxo Misconduct Case


  • The Wall Street Journal

U.S. Rebuffed in Glaxo Misconduct Case


A federal trial judge on Tuesday acquitted a former GlaxoSmithKline PLC lawyer in a high-profile corporate misconduct case, dealing a blow to the government's effort to target individuals in probes of the pharmaceutical industry.
U.S. District Court Judge Roger Titus in Maryland took the rare move of acquitting former Glaxo lawyer Lauren Stevens without sending the case to the jury.
Judge Titus called his summary move to acquit Ms. Stevens a first in his seven-and-a-half years on the federal bench. "The defendant in this case should never have been prosecuted and she should be permitted to resume her career," he said.
Prosecutors had alleged Ms. Stevens obstructed a Food and Drug Administration investigation into whether Glaxo had improperly promoted the antidepressant Wellbutrin for weight loss, a use not approved by the FDA.
The government's defeat points to the difficulty of prosecuting individuals over alleged wrongdoing at large corporations, where teams of people may be involved in a matter and it is hard to show that executives intended to break the law.
Despite calls for prosecution of top Wall Street figures in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the Justice Department has brought only a handful of cases against individuals, and lost some prominent cases.
Ms. Stevens's sudden acquittal could hurt other government efforts, including the long-running investigation of Glaxo for marketing issues related to several drugs, said defense attorneys. They said the Justice Department and the Department of Health and Human Services may have to review their larger strategy of targeting executives and lawyers at pharmaceutical companies.
The Justice Department cannot appeal Tuesday's acquittal. "We believe these charges were well-founded and that the jury should have been allowed to deliberate and decide this case," a department spokesman said.
Pharmaceutical companies have paid billions of dollars to settle various marketing-related charges with the government, but only a few executives have pleaded guilty to any crimes.Government officials have said they decided to go after more individuals to create a stronger deterrent and prevent companies from viewing fines as merely "a cost of doing business."
Prosecutors alleged Ms. Stevens falsely denied that the company had promoted Wellbutrin for unapproved or "off-label" uses, despite knowing that the company had sponsored programs with doctors' groups involving Wellbutrin. Companies are barred from off-label marketing but doctors can generally prescribe an FDA-approved drug for any condition.
Defense lawyers for Ms. Stevens said she provided legitimate and zealous representation of Glaxo and relied in good faith on the advice she received from an outside law firm.
The judge agreed, saying it would be a "miscarriage of justice" to let the case get to the jury.
"We did not have a bad five minutes in that courtroom; if it had been a prize fight, they would have stopped it," said Ms. Stevens's lawyer, Reid Weingarten, who has represented Cabinet secretaries and corporate chiefs.
It is rare for the government to charge a lawyer over advice given to a client, because such conversations are generally protected unless the lawyer is helping the client commit a crime.
Judge Titus's ruling is likely to make such prosecutions rarer still. "There is an enormous potential for abuse in allowing prosecution of an attorney for the giving of legal advice," the judge said.
The government has long been investigating Glaxo over various allegations related to sales of antidepressants Paxil and Wellbutrin, as well as its former popular diabetes drug Avandia. Glaxo hasn't been charged with wrongdoing in these cases, but the investigation is continuing, according to people familiar with the matter.
Its outside counsel, King & Spalding LLP, didn't return calls requesting comment.
The government hasn't said whether the prosecution of Ms. Stevens was part of an effort to push Glaxo into a plea deal. It said in court documents in December that the Stevens case was part of an "ongoing underlying health-care fraud investigation" looking at her and "potential criminal activity by others."
The company has declined to comment on the cases, and it hasn't said under what terms Ms. Stevens left the company last year.
It said Tuesday that it was "pleased" with her vindication.
"The acquittal certainly strengthens Glaxo's hand in negotiations with the government about a corporate resolution of their case," said John Fleder, a defense attorney with Hyman, Phelps & McNamara PC who wasn't involved in the case.
FDA officials and the inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services have said that the government wants to make more use of an administrative option to punish executives by excluding pharmaceutical company leaders from the industry. That option may look more attractive after the failure of the criminal case against Ms. Stevens.
Companies that employ an "excluded" executive can be prevented from selling products to the U.S. government—which almost all pharmaceutical firms do. In essence, the step can force a company to dump its chief in order to do business with Medicare or the Veterans Administration.
In April, the HHS inspector general created a firestorm in the drug industry when the agency said it intends to exclude the longtime chief executive of Forest Laboratories Inc, Howard Solomon. The company has protested the move and said Mr. Solomon had nothing to do with marketing violations for which the company agreed to pay more than $300 million in civil and criminal fines.
Write to Alicia Mundy at alicia.mundy@wsj.com and Brent Kendall at brent.kendall@dowjones.com

Monday, May 2, 2011

WSJ 4/26/11- U.S. Effort to Remove Drug CEO Jolts Firms

The Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2011, p.A1

U.S. Effort to Remove Drug CEO Jolts Firms

A government attempt to oust a longtime drug-company chief executive over his company's marketing violations is raising alarms in that industry and beyond about a potential expansion of federal involvement in the business world.
The Department of Health and Human Services this month notified Howard Solomon of Forest Laboratories Inc. that it intends to exclude him from doing business with the federal government. This, in turn, could prevent Forest from selling its drugs to Medicare, Medicaid and the Veterans Administration. If the government implements its ban, Forest would have to dump Mr. Solomon, now 83 years old, in order to protect its corporate revenue. No drug company, large or small, can afford to lose out on sales to the federal government, a major customer.
[HealthCop] Bloomberg
Forest Labs CEO Howard Solomon

The campaign against drug-company CEOs is part of a larger Obama administration effort to pursue individual executives blamed for wrongdoing rather than simply punishing companies. The government has tried to prosecute Wall Street executives in connection with the 2008 financial crisis, but with limited success.

The Health and Human Services department startled drug makers last year when the agency said it would start invoking a little-used administrative policy under the Social Security Act against pharmaceutical executives. This policy allows officials to bar corporate leaders from health-industry companies doing business with the government, if a drug company is guilty of criminal misconduct. The agency said a chief executive or other leader can be banned even if he or she had no knowledge of a company's criminal actions. Retaining a banned executive can trigger a company's exclusion from government business.
The "action against the CEO of Forest Labs is a game changer," said Richard Westling, a corporate defense attorney in Nashville who has represented executives in different industries against the government.
According to Mr. Westling, "It would be a mistake to see this as solely a health-care industry issue. The use of sanctions such as exclusion and debarment to punish individuals where the government is unable to prove a direct legal or regulatory violation could have wide-ranging impact." An exclusion penalty could be more costly than a Justice Department prosecution.
He said that the Defense Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, for example, have debarment powers similar to the HHS exclusion authority.
The Forest case has its origins in an investigation into the company's marketing of its big-selling antidepressants Celexa and Lexapro. Last September, Forest made a plea agreement with the government, under which it is paying $313 million in criminal and civil penalties over sales-related misconduct.
A federal court made the deal final in March. Forest Labs representatives said they were shocked when the intent-to-ban notice was received a few weeks later, because Mr. Solomon wasn't accused by the government of misconduct.
Forest is sticking by its chief. "No one has ever alleged that Mr. Solomon did anything wrong, and excluding him [from the industry] is unjustified," said general counsel Herschel Weinstein. "It would also set an extremely troubling precedent that would create uncertainty throughout the industry and discourage regulatory settlements."
The pharmaceutical industry has paid billions of dollars in civil and criminal penalties over the past decade, but the government believes they no longer have much deterrent effect.
The new use of exclusion is meant to "alter the cost-benefit calculus of the corporate executives," said Lew Morris, chief counsel for the Department of Health and Human Services's inspector general, in congressional testimony last month.
The move against Forest's Mr. Solomon—its CEO, president and chairman—brings the campaign to a new level. Lawyers not involved in the Forest case said the attempt to punish an executive who isn't accused of misconduct could tie up the industry's day-to-day work in legal knots.
"This 'gotcha' approach to enforcement runs the risk of creating a climate within organizations that is inconsistent with the spirit of innovation that is critical to the industry," said Allen Waxman of Kaye Scholer LLP in New York, who was formerly an in-house counsel at a drug maker.
Mr. Solomon became chief executive in 1977 and built Forest from a maker of vitamin tablets into a global company with more than $4 billion in annual sales.
His son is writer Andrew Solomon, who won a National Book Award in 2001 for his book about struggling with depression. Inspired by his son, Howard Solomon pushed Forest into the antidepressant market and turned Celexa and Lexapro into successes. In the year ending March 2004, the two drugs accounted for about 82% of the company's sales.
In October 2010, HHS outlined how it could use the exclusion tool on individuals without proof of personal misconduct. The first application involved the CEO of a smaller pharmaceutical maker in St. Louis. The executive stepped down. He has since pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor marketing violation and was sentenced to prison and fined.
Forest pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor in connection with its marketing of Celexa as a treatment for children and adolescents before the drug won approval for pediatric use from the Food and Drug Administration. The company also paid fines over civil accusations.
Forest assumed it had put the matter behind it after the plea hearing in March. But on April 8, the Health and Human Services inspector general sent the letter declaring its intent to exclude Mr. Solomon from his roles at Forest. Mr. Solomon has 30 days to ask the inspector general to revoke the move, but if he loses and has to take his case to federal court, he may temporarily step down from his job, according to the company. The inspector general's office declined to comment; Mr. Solomon's personal attorney couldn't be reached.
The push to target executives comes in the wake of complaints in Congress that few executives bear the cost for bad corporate behavior. The U.S. has prosecuted only a handful of individuals in the Wall Street meltdown of 2008.
In November 2010, the government indicted a former attorney for GlaxoSmithKline PLC related to allegations of improper marketing of the antidepressant Wellbutrin for weight loss. The lawyer has pleaded not guilty, and her defense counsel has said her actions were based on advice from Glaxo's outside counsel. The company has said it is cooperating with the government.
—Scott L. Greenberg contributed to this article. Write to Alicia Mundy at alicia.mundy@wsj.com

Saturday, March 7, 2009

Question for HR (Human Resources)

Question for HR
Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics?

By Robert Shattuck

HR’s interest in its company’s employees should extend as a matter of course to the corporation’s policies and procedures for propagating ethical business conduct by the employees. If something is an impediment to that, HR should want to be aware of it.

This article contends that the country’s civil liability system impairs business ethics.

The contention is based on common knowledge about human nature and a common sense analysis of what is needed for society to obtain ethical behavior. HR has first hand knowledge about the company’s employees, the environment in which they work, and the company’s code of business ethics, and HR should have a good sense of employees’ thinking, psychology, decision making process and resultant actions. Accordingly, HR should be in an excellent position to evaluate the arguments that are made in this article.

Human nature; how society regulates behavior

The starting place for this articles contention is human nature and why and how society tries to regulate behavior that grows out of human nature. Let us lay out what we commonly know.
Probably growing out of the self-preservation instinct, self-seeking motivations in the human species are powerful and predominant; altruism is weak.

Societal organization entails a suppression of some of an individual’s self-serving motivation and action in favor of a greater common good. This is because promotion of the well being of a group can contribute to the well being of the individuals in the group.

Society has various mechanisms to mitigate self-seeking behavior and to alter it to promote a greater common good. These include religion; the promulgation of codes of conduct; bestowal of honors and esteem on exemplary individuals; formal education programs that teach ethics; and systems of shame and legal punishments for individuals who violate society’s strictures.
The attempt to regulate behavior occurs within a number of organizational structures. These include families, corporations, political parties, churches, and labor unions. An entire nation can be considered a smaller unit within the world community.

The family is the smallest unit in which an individual is called on to subjugate self for the good of the group. At the family level, there can develop a strong sense of identity between individual and family interests. As one moves up the organizational scale, the individual’s interests and those of the larger unit are less susceptible of conflation, and the more cognate tools referred to above are employed to articulate and implement society’s prescriptions relative to self-seeking behavior.

An individual’s powerful self-seeking motivations are for money, power, material possessions, social standing, sex, honor, esteem, aesthetic refinements, recreational pleasures and ego gratification. The first listed motivator of money can contribute significantly to the procuring of the other desired objects. Much of the motivation at a larger unit level, such as a corporation, is a collective expression of the constituent individuals’ motivations to obtain money and other objects of their desires.

Lying, cheating, stealing, defrauding, misrepresentation, concealment, breach of fiduciary obligations, bribery, blackmail, harassment, and lack of proper regard for the interests of third parties, have great potential for individuals and larger units such as corporations to obtain money. This is done, however, at the expense of other individuals and other units in the society.
The role of human intelligence is a very significant factor. Equipped with that intelligence, the human species is excellently endowed to conceive and implement dishonest activities and to exploit knowledge and information that others are lacking.

The extent and pervasiveness of dishonest, self-seeking activities by human beings is difficult to gauge.

Dishonest activities that are carried out successfully are concealed, and any researcher trying to estimate the quantum of dishonest behavior by human beings is ignorant of what has been concealed.

Dishonest activities on a large scale that are discovered get reported in the news. There is an unending procession of publicity about wrongdoing in the commercial world. It seems extensive and exhibits interesting combinations of novelty and repetition, and sometimes surprising audacity and scope. In the "boom and bust" cycles of the past decade, we have been inundated with exposures of many instances of large scale wrongdoing that was perpetrated during the "boom" part of the cycle.

In the daily news about commercial wrongdoing, gauging the aggregate amount is complicated by the presence of large swaths of gray areas of right and wrong and varying degrees of culpability of involved individuals. Also, to repeat, one never knows about wrongdoing that has taken place and that is not found out.

Dishonesty that occurs on a smaller scale is not newsworthy. Sometimes many small-scale activities of a similar, wrongful nature get reported in the aggregate. Most of us are aware of significant amounts of fraud that occur related to car insurance and car repairs, Medicare and Medicaid claims, identity theft and credit cards, cheating on taxes, overbilling on government contracts, and bribing of government officials to obtain commercial contracts. From lots of everyday experience, people are distrustful in hundreds of commercial transactions they enter into over their lifetime. All in all, it is fair to say that the total quantum of small-scale dishonesty is unknowable but that there is a lot of it that goes on.

Business ethics and the role of the law

Business ethics is supposed to counter and lessen the perpetration of dishonest activity in the commercial world.

As referred to above, business ethics, along with other forms of moral instruction imparted through religion and other institutions, are taught in society, and society has practices for bestowing honors and awards on exemplary individuals.

It is submitted, however, that, without legal punishments for individuals who violate society’s strictures, society would be feckless in its efforts to lessen dishonest commercial activities, and that society needs to be rigorous and exacting in designing and implementing its regime of legal punishments for this purpose. In this regard, it would be a troublesome sign if society was fooled into thinking that its system was functioning effectively.

What is needed in the law for it to be rigorous and exacting?

One component is close attention to whether something is done deliberately and intentionally, or whether it is done negligently, or whether it is without fault. If a party who is without fault is punished and forced to pay a cost, that can undermine the regime of legal punishments. First, it can deflect attention from making sure that intentional wrongdoers are punished (i.e., the potential for societal self-deception to the effect, well, costs were paid so punishment must have been meted out so the law must have been doing its job). Further it offers opportunity for guilty parties actively to avoid punishment by accomplishing a shift to innocent parties. Would be wrongdoers will be encouraged by the idea that the responsibility can be shifted away from them if they decide to go forward with their wrongdoing and it is found out. When innocent parties are punished while guilty ones escape responsibility, a general disrespect for the law is engendered, and that disrespect is detrimental of the law performing a purpose of fostering ethical business conduct.

As to intentional wrongdoing versus negligent wrongdoing, a regime of legal punishments might rightfully be less strict with negligent wrongdoing. This is on the basis that people, as regards intentional wrongdoing, can and should be required in an absolute way to choose consciously not do the wrong, whereas everyone is negligent to some degree from time to time and "zero tolerance" is not a realistic objective. In the case of negligence, the law can and should look closely where, for example, the negligence is slight and other intentional or other more negligent actions (including of the plaintiff) caused a loss, and the law might also take into account that available resources for investigating and punishing wrongdoing are limited, and intentional wrongdoing should have priority.

Further, the law needs to be a definite as possible in advance about what is wrongful and what is not wrongful. Unless a person is able to know what is wrongful and what is not wrongful, there the person is disabled from being able to make a decision not to do something that is wrongful, and the law will fail as a tool for fostering ethical behavior.

Differentiating among intentional wrongdoers, negligent wrongdoers, and parties who are without fault should be in the foreground in dealing with entities that represent conglomerations of individuals, such as corporations. Any corporate act of wrongdoing is designed and implemented by particular individuals in the corporation, but lots of other individuals may be wholly without fault and costs and punishments imposed on the corporation will be ultimately borne by these latter individuals. The discussion above about the importance of punishing guilty individuals, and of not punishing innocent individuals while guilty ones escape, applies in the context of a corporation, and the legal system needs to strive to impose costs and punishments on individuals who design and implement a corporate wrongdoing and to try to be sparring in imposing them on innocent individuals.

The environment in which corporate wrongdoing happens

A corporation’s main objective is to operate as profitably as possible. The greater the profits, the more shareholders and employees can be rewarded monetarily. There are pressures on a daily basis for employees to advance the corporation’s business. Time frames are relatively short, typically for the corporation to achieve the current year’s revenue and profit goals. Bonuses for the contributions that employees make are paid on an annual basis. The employees’ jobs are their means of livelihood and of providing for their families. Plugging away every day to keep the business running profitably and to give security for this year’s source of income is a top priority for employees.

A corporate wrongdoing will be something intended to benefit the corporation financially by increasing revenues, reducing expenses or avoiding or lessening losses in the business. The corporate acts that comprise the wrongdoing are conceived of, authorized by, and carried out by officers and employees of the corporation, frequently a small fraction of all the corporation’s officers and employees. Of the perpetrating group, some have fuller knowledge of the wrongful activity and others will have very limited awareness. Many employees will be completely ignorant of the wrongful actions of the corporation, as well shareholders and customers being ignorant that wrongdoing is going on.

The officers and employees who know what is going on participate as part of their job to do things to benefit the corporation’s business. Their participation evidences their value to the corporation, and their assumption is that they will be rewarded for that in the compensation they receive from the corporation.

If an officer or an employee who is part of the group that perpetrates the corporate wrongdoing thinks the activity is questionable or that it is a clear wrongdoing that has risks of being discovered, and if the officer or employee has qualms about what is being done, there is significant internalized pressure nonetheless to go along with what the corporation is doing and to not try to block the activity. Raising objections can be viewed negatively by one’s peers in the corporation or by higher ups and result in adverse impact on the employee’s status and compensation in the corporation. The actions in question may be in a gray area and not clearly wrong. A tipping factor for the employee to go along can be a perception that, if something untoward happens as a result, only the corporation as a whole will bear the brunt and the employee will escape any personal punishment for his role in the corporate wrongdoing.
In short, all corporations are in the business of earning profits, by going along the employee is just doing his job and what others want him to do, the requested action is possibly in a gray area anyway, his employer will not punish him for what he did, and any other corporation that might learn of his willingness to go along with what others wanted to him to do will not hold that against him in getting another job.

Where and how the law undermines business ethics

Let us focus on where and how the law goes awry in trying to attack corporate wrongdoing. Not all of the law goes awry but a very significant component of it does. This is a component in the law that has, by and large, been wrought by lawyers, and in particular by plaintiff’s lawyers. Let us consider them, their motivations and what they have wrought in the law.

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are part of the human species and their most powerful motivations are the same self-seeking motivations that are the most powerful for the rest of us. For plaintiffs’ lawyers, the big money is in suing the corporation. This big money comes in small bits out of lot of different pockets, many of which are entirely innocent of the wrongdoing, including shareholders who may receive slightly reduced dividends, innocent employees who may suffer slightly reduced wages, or customers of the corporation who wind up paying slightly higher prices.

To the extent that is all that happens, and no special punishment is ever imposed on the group of officers and employees who have personal culpability in the wrongdoing, there is going to be a substantial failure of deterrence effect, to wit, the officers and employees who were responsible are confirmed in their previous view that the wrongdoing they participated in had short term favorable financial results for the corporation, they the officers and employees got rewarded for the year in the compensation they received, the wrongdoing might never come to light and everything would be the rosier for it, and it is too bad the wrongdoing was discovered, but the officers and employees have come away basically unscathed, and either their current employer corporation may try a new trick next time, or else they have proved their mettle and the next corporation that employs them will be interested in seeing what they can come up for it.
The question presented is the extent to which plaintiffs’ lawyers have an effect of undermining society’s efforts to be rigorous in fining, jailing and otherwise punishing corporate officers and employees who are responsible for conceiving, authorizing, designing and implementing corporate wrongdoing.

Insight into answering the foregoing question can be obtained through a comparison of plaintiffs’ lawyers with governmental regulators, criminal prosecutors, state attorneys general and legislators, with a focus on their respective manners of compensation. The latter parties work on behalf of the public to design, implement and enforce laws and regulations and a regime of legal punishment to curtail dishonest commercial practices and conduct. The compensation they receive is reasonable for the work done, and in particular it is not geared to the dollar amount of economic activity that their public work affects (i.e., legislators and regulators don’t get paid millions of dollars because they put into effect large governmental budgets, levy commensurate amounts of taxes, and write and enforce laws and regulations that affect billions of dollars of economic activity and that impose and allocate large economic costs on and among businesses, consumers and other parties.)

Plaintiffs’ lawyers perform a similar public role in the design, implementation and enforcement of legal punishments to curtail dishonest commercial practices. Their compensation, which is huge, is geared to the amounts of economic activity that their work affects and to the economic costs that they get shifted around among various parties; the larger the scope of their lawsuits and the greater the dollar amount of the costs they can get shifted around, the greater their compensation. This manner of compensation of plaintiffs’ lawyers creates very powerful incentives for them to seek the objectives of (i) expansion of harms or detriments for which a payment should be made, (ii) higher rather than lower amounts that should be paid, (iii) expansion of liability where there is no fault, (iv) disregard of distinctions between intentionally culpable, negligently culpable and faultless parties, especially in the context of corporations comprised of a conglomeration of employees, shareholders and customers , (v) disregard of culpability of plaintiffs in their own injuries and harms, (vi) not having clear rules in advance about what is wrongful and what is not wrongful, so that a person does not know what is wrongful and cannot make a decision not to do a wrongful act, and exposing every decision and action to an ex post facto determination that it was wrongful and for which there is liability, (vii) disregard of rational cost/benefit principles, (viii) the invocation of junk science, and (ix) usurpation by them and the courts of the powers of the legislative branch and the executive branch regulatory apparatus.

These objectives of plaintiffs’ lawyers are inconsistent with the need, as discussed, for the law to be exacting in punishing and imposing costs on guilty individuals and in not punishing innocent individuals while guilty individuals are not held responsible, and of providing clear rules in advance about what is wrongful and what is not, in order that people may make a decision not to do a wrongful act. The plaintiffs’ lawyers have been very successful in achieving their objectives. This has bred contempt and disdain for the law, swallowed up large amounts of resources that could be available for other activities more effective for promoting business ethics, and has been otherwise distractive and undermining of society’s use of legal punishments to curtail commercial wrongdoing.

The Vioxx case as an example of how the law fails business ethics

Take for example the Vioxx litigation that recently worked its way through the judicial pipeline.

Let us start with all the shareholders who purchased Merck stock in the weeks leading up to the Vioxx announcement and who suffered an immediate 30% or so decline in value following the announcement. Profits that Merck made from Vioxx did not accrue to those shareholders, and they are entirely innocent of whatever wrongdoing Merck committed regarding Vioxx; nonetheless the legal liability system that is entrenched will give no consideration to those factors and results in that 30% being taken from them and contributed to the recovery that the plaintiffs eventually make.

Next consider, if Merck is guilty of wrongdoing, whether any officer or employee of Merck will be personally punished for his participation in the wrongdoing. There has been no indication that this is going to happen.

Next consider the hundreds of millions of dollars that plaintiffs’ attorneys have or will receive in the Merck litigation. Think how those sums might be alternatively expended in order to pay for programs and activities that would concretely advance protective and preventive objectives related to drugs such as Vioxx. These might include: greater FDA funding for post-drug approval monitoring and studies to detect adverse drug effects; design and implementation of better safeguards at the physician and patient level relative to decisions for a drug to be prescribed in a particular case; development of concrete protocols and guidelines for testing of drugs that drug companies could follow that would protect them against subsequent liability; development of concrete "conflict of interest" rules for researchers and physicians involved in testing or promoting a drug and punitive enforcement of the rules against researchers and physicians individually.

Ultimately, there is a question of what exactly the wrongdoing of Merck was, articulated with sufficient specificity, that Merck and other drug companies can have advance notice of such specifics so they can avoid "wrongdoing" in the future. For all the billions of dollars that winds up getting paid in the Vioxx litigation, no such concrete guidance may be forthcoming at all from the litigation, and, if that is so, all that happens is effectively a huge transfer from one set of parties without fault to other parties who have suffered a harm not caused by any wrongdoing of the first parties.

The problem of the plaintiffs’ lawyers

The situation with Vioxx is emblematic of how plaintiffs’ lawyers cause a huge consumption of manpower, economic resources and mental attention and effort that has little or nothing to do with accomplishing reduction of corporate wrongdoing and is a corresponding enormous diversion of those resources from society’s efforts to reduce corporate wrongdoing.

In evaluating this argument that plaintiffs’ lawyers undermine the promotion of business ethics, we should not listen to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Our country has seen enough in recent years of baneful effects of large amounts of compensation that create conflicts of interest and that that cause the recipient to advocate or follow a course of action that will increase that compensation and contrary to the better interests of other individuals and groups. Corporate executives standing to gain fortunes from stock options committed massive accounting frauds that contributed to maintaining and increasing lofty stock price levels that would enormously benefit them under their stock options and other compensation arrangements. Accountants have been charged with faulty accounting work arising from the conflict of having lucrative consulting work with the audit client. Stock analysts have been inappropriately influenced in their stock reports by reason of getting compensation based on investment banking business their employer gets from companies the analyst covers. Brokerage firms corrupted the IPO market by allocating stock in hidden exchanges for inflated commissions on unrelated transactions. Mutual funds and insurance brokers have acted in wrongful disregard of conflicts of interest in order to increase their revenues and profits.

Plaintiffs’ lawyers are no different. They are conflicted to the core by their compensation arrangements and are incapable of rendering to society any honest evaluation of how well the current civil liability system is in serving society’s objective of promoting ethical business behavior.

Conclusion

The above is a very descriptive, common sensical, common knowledge based explication of how the civil liability system undermines the promotion of ethical business conduct, and how the law results in a significant diversion of economic resources away from beneficial and desirable ethics programs and activities and misallocates those resources to wasteful and counterproductive uses.

First and foremost corporate ethics officers should be concerned if the civil liability system undermines the accomplishing of their business ethics objectives.

HR should also be interested. As stated, HR has its own first hand knowledge about the company’s employees, the environment in which they work, and the company’s code of business ethics, and HR should have its own sense of employees’ thinking, psychology, decision making process and resultant actions. Accordingly, HR should be in an excellent position to make its own evaluation of the arguments that made by this article and should be in a position to consult with the corporate ethics officer and with higher level management on this issue.

It is appreciated that HR and ethics officers are subject to higher level corporate management. If the civil liability system does in fact materially undermine the corporate objective to nurture and inculcate ethical conduct by the employees as argued in this article, that could be venturing into a bigger domain than ethics officers or HR are in charge of, and both HR and ethics officers may be constrained in raising with management suggestions or ideas that do not fits within the big picture strategy and tactics of corporate management in responding to and dealing with the travesties of our nation's civil liability system.

Regardless of what higher up management may think, it is hoped that HR will at least read this article and reach its own conclusions, whether or not HR can act on its conclusions.

Saturday, November 29, 2008

Greed, anger, reform, repair, lawyers, judges

Our county is surveying the wreckage in its financial system and a serious threat to its economic functioning, and it is learning unhappy lessons.

One theme coming out is how compensation structures led to abusive disregard for the property of other parties and resulted in great harm.

The culprits that gave the country subprime included banks and mortgage companies that ginned up gobs of current income for themselves without due regard for whether the home purchaser could afford the house in the long run. This was enabled by investment banks and bankers who, for large underwriting fees and personal compensation, engineered the packaging of mortgage loans into securities that could be sold to investors around the world, which took the risk off the banks and mortgage companies, and offloaded it onto distant investors who, as things turned out, did not understand what they bought. Not all the packaged loans could be sold off, and in order to make their underwriting deals work and get their fees and hefty personal compensation, the management at investment banks used their shareholders' equity to take up some of the securities, thereby sticking that undue risk on their shareholders. The subprime people also included the rating agencies that compromised their ratings work for the compensation they received from the underwriters. In Washington, the executives at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, in order to grow their exhorbitant compensation packages, were more than happy, using the taxpayer's credit, to have Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae inflate the bubble that burst and that became the debacle.

The foregoing litany, which could be extended, has focused anger on compensation structures for corporate executives, managers and other persons that resulted in commercial banks, mortgage companies, investment banks and other parties doing things without proper regard for the assets, property and value belonging to other parties, such as home buyers, investors, shareholders and taxpayers, and that ultimately did trillions of dollars of financial damage and put the nation's economy at risk.

As the country looks for ways to dig out of its problems, and as a new administration comes to Washington to lead the effort, the country is getting immersed in a new economic regimen of governmental investment and oversight that was inconceivable a year ago. The government, investors and public are taking a close look at compensation structures that led to damage to the economy. Where public funds have been brought to bear, the government has dictated limitations on executive compensation and the payment of dividends to stockholders.

With with all this attention to trying to understand the causes of the crisis, including the role of compensation structures, and how best to repair and rebuild the economy, this review should include looking at the country's legal system, the costs it imposes on the country, the compensation structures for plaintiffs' lawyers, and how the same has harmed the economy in the past and will hinder its rebuilding.

For many years, there has been strenuous contention that the legal system has been exploited by the plaintiffs lawyers to enrich themselves by imposing unjustifiable costs for the economy. For an excellent chronicle of this, see http://www.overlawyered.com/. Further consider how the plaintiffs' lawyers compensation structure has resulted in undermining the inculcation of ethical conduct by employees of corporations (see Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics? ). Consider also the destruction of shareholder value in Citigroup that was in the news last week. Citigroup shareholders who are angry at Citigroup executives for having compensation structures that led them to expose the shareholders to inappropriate risk in order to get underwriting business and thereby justify management paying themselves exhorbitant compensation should consider how something similar took place related to Citigroup's involvement with Enron earlier in the decade, and how the plaintiffs' lawyers, fueled by their compensation structure, complicitly enabled Citigroup's management and piled on to inflict even more damage on the hapless Citigroup shareholders. See Enron's smartest guys, crooks, victims and other saps.

With the Obama administration coming to Washingon, there is concern that the lawyers are going to be better positioned to promote their exploitive ways for enriching themselves at the expense of the rest of the society. With much repair work needed for the economy, and with the change in the national administration, now is more important than ever to bolster publicity and scrutiny of how the plaintiffs lawyers exploit the existing legal system to enrich themselves by imposing wasteful costs on the rest of the society and the need to lessen the economic drag of these costs that will hinder the country in repairing its economy and regaining the jobs and personal income that all of the citizens want.

Further, judges are the immediate overseers of the legal system. Just as other government regulators are under scrutiny for how well they performed in their oversight of activities that contributed to the current crisis, so judges ought to be scrutinized for how they have performed in overseeing the legal system and the costs that have been imposed on society. Primary attention should be given to the compensation structure of plaintiffs' lawyers and the deleterious effects of that. If those compensation structures were changed, and the amount of wasteful litigation lessened, the benefits would include savings of defense lawyers fees. Also judges could be more hard nosed about the fees they allow in bankruptcy cases, which would provide aid in rehabilitating and recycling business assets during the period of economic repair.