Showing posts with label J2. Middlesex County Retirement System. Show all posts
Showing posts with label J2. Middlesex County Retirement System. Show all posts

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Retirement Systems of Alabama 11/08 reply to me


Teachers'
Paul R. Hubbert, Chair
Sarah Swindle, Vice Chair
Employees'
State State Police Public Judicial
Bob Riley, Chair
John H. Wilkerson, Jr., Vice Chair
THE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS OF ALABAMA
David G. Bronner, CEO
Marcus H. Reynolds, Jr., Deputy
November 20, 2008
Mr. Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, Alabama 35223
RE: Middlesex County Retirement System Class Action
Dear Mr. Shattuck:
Your letter of November 14, 2008, to Dr. David Bronner regarding the
participation of governmental retirement systems in class action securities fraud cases has
been referred to me. I understand, and share to some degree, your concern but I think
that your analysis is missing something very important. Both corporate fraud and class
action lawsuit abuse have existed in this country for many years. In recent years
governmental retirement plans have become active in class action security fraud cases to
prevent the abuse of which you complain as well as to police the marketplace.
In 1995 Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) giving institutional investors priority in the selection of lead plaintiff in class
action security fraud cases. Prior to that the first plaintiff to the courthouse was named
lead plaintiff and that plaintiff might be an individual with no interest in the case other
than receiving kickbacks from a plaintiff's law firm for allowing it to use his name as
plaintiff. Congress believed that institutional investors would be more responsible lead
plaintiffs and events since the enactment of the Reform Act have proven that belief to be
true.
Even so, public pension plans do not rush to the courthouse to be lead plaintiffs.
Many, if not most, of the larger public pension plans in the United States follow a
procedure similar to that adopted by RSA several years ago. When a securities fraud case
is filed we check to see if we suffered losses due to the alleged misconduct and whether
the extent of our losses is such that we might be considered by the court to be a proper
lead plaintiff. We check to see if any other public pension plans will seek lead plaintiff
status and whether they will be represented by a responsible, competent law firm. If
there is a responsible lead plaintiff represented by a responsible law firm we consider that
we and the class will be well represented. If there is not another responsible lead plaintiff
represented by a responsible law firm, than we may feel it is our duty to represent the
class, if we qualify to do so and if it is a meritorious law suit. If we choose to seek lead

Page 2
plaintiff status and if we are selected as lead plaintiff, we control the litigation and, we
control settlement negotiations, not the lawyers.
As lead plaintiffs, public pension plans have selected more responsible law firms
to represent the class, have negotiated significantly lower attorney's fees, and have
exercised more control over the case, taking into consideration many factors, including
the need to reform corporate conduct to protect the integrity of the market place and the
continuing health of the defendant corporation. Public pension plans, as lead plaintiffs,
have sought remedies in addition to monetary damages, to compensate both former and
current stockholders of the company who have lost money due to corporate fraud, such as
management reform, while helping to prevent such future misconduct that would damage
the corporation and stock holders and have sought to eradicate fraudulent market
practices that affect the financial markets. Monetary damages are, of course, often paid
by the defendant's insurance company.
Public pension plans have also sought to hold liable the individuals responsible
for the fraud and other companies that aid and abet securities fraud. Recent court rulings
have made it more difficult to hold aiders and abettors accountable and indemnity
agreements make it difficult to recover against the individual corporate executive who
has defrauded both the company and its stockholders.
Even when a public pension plan is not the lead plaintiff in a securities fraud case
public pension plans have often appeared in court and objected to attorneys fees
requested in securities fraud cases and have been successful in reducing the fee actually
awarded by the court ..
It is not a perfect system but better, far better, than it was before public pension
plans began to take an active role in this type litigation. In accepting the role of lead
plaintiff in a class action lawsuit the public pension plans are simply being good citizens.
I hope and trust that this gives you a better understanding of the role of public
pension plans in security fraud litigation. If you have any further questions I would be
happy to discuss this issue with you.
Sincerely,
William T. Stephens
General Counsel
WTSlbhj


From: RDShatt
To: ersinfo@rsa-al.gov
Sent: 11/23/2008 7:54:26 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: For William Stephens re Middlesex County Retirement System Class Action
For William Stephens re Middlesex County Retirement System Class Action
Dear Mr. Stephens,
Thank you very, very much for your reply letter dated November 20, 2008. I would greatly like to discuss this topic further with you, but I am not sure how much time you are willing to spend.
Our entire society, including The Retirement Systems of Alabama, has a significant interest in reducing corporate fraud and misconduct, including such as occurred in the above class action.
I contend that the plaintiffs' lawyers undermine this societal objective. My argumentation about this is set out at this link Does the Law Undermine Business Ethics? .
If you would care to take the time to read my argumentation and comment on it, I would be very interested in what you have to say.
On the other hand, I will understand it that is asking too much.
Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck

Friday, December 24, 2010

Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn?

From: RDShatt@aol.com
To: grundfest@stanford.edu, Cox@law.duke.edu, klacroix@oakbridgeins.com
Sent: 12/24/2010 4:30:08 A.M. Central Standard Time

Subj: Private Securities Litigation: Important Deterrent or Wasteful Churn?

Dear Professors Grundfest and Cox, Mr. LaCroix, and Mr. Coffey (address for Mr. Coffey not yet found),

I have read with interest Mr. LaCroix's above referenced post in his blog. You may glean the extent of my interest from my own blog How To Combat Plaintiffs' Lawyers .

I would like to offer some comments.

First, some rhetorical and/or loaded questions: Who and what are the drivers and determinants of the state of the law? Is it plaintiffs' lawyers and their lobbying and other influence with lawmakers, judges and others? Is it judges who have done an adequate policy evaluation of their judicial actions and decisions, insofar as they have discretion regarding the same? Is it academics who have debated the way the law should be and who make recommendations about the same that are accepted by lawmakers and judges? Is it critics, such as The Wall Street Journal?

Also, insofar as plaintiffs' lawyers are the drivers and determinants. to what extent do they exert their influence to achieve a state of the law that benefits themselves to the detriment of the societal interest in how the law operates? How demanding should academics and citizens be of their lawmakers and judges that those persons exert great skepticism about any input the plaintiffs' lawyers have regarding how the law should be and give the plaintiffs' lawyers no benefit of the doubt, including, for example, not finding it an adequate justification that there is "some deterrent effect" from private securities litigation, or that a "private/public partnership" has performed better than "public" alone when there is a choice to beef up with more funding for the "public" effort?

I took particular note of Mr. LaCroix's statement that "there are a large number of sophisticated, well-informed and profit motivated institutional investors that continue to actively participate in securities litigation, some serving frequently as lead plaintiffs." The reason for my interest is that I was once notified of a class action that caused me to send scores of emails to governmental retirement plans and members of the National Institute of Pension Plan Administrators, asking why they weren't "screaming bloody murder." You may read the text of those emails here http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/2008/11/why-arent-government-retirement-systems.html and here http://robertshattuck.blogspot.com/2008/11/why-arent-retirement-plan-trustees.html . I did not get a single response.

I did not think, at the time, about "pay to play" type stuff going on in securities class action litigation that could keep parties from screaming bloody murder. Trust The Wall Street Journal to enlighten me in February with this item Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow .

On the question of whether individual contibution is needed in order to achieve a better deterrent effect, I have taken the tack of trying to introduce the subject to academics and other professionals in the business ethics field. I have done this mainly through an article I have written that you can find at this link: Does the Civil Liability System Undermine Business Ethics? I have made scant headway in interesting ethics professionals in the subject matter.

Thank you for reading this email.

Sincerely,
Rob Shattuck

Wednesday, December 22, 2010

WSJ on trial lawyers contributing to pension officials


  • The Wall Street Journal

Trial Lawyers Contribute, Shareholder Suits Follow

Norfolk County, Mass., has only a small pension fund, but it is a big player in court.

Two weeks ago, the fund joined with two others in a shareholder suit against drugstore chain CVS Caremark Corp., whose stock had fallen. It was the 12th time since 2006 the pension fund has gone to court after a stock it owned declined.Former Ohio Attorney General Marc Dann received campaign contributions from out-of-state plaintiffs' firms.

For 10 of the suits, including the latest, the pension fund hired a New York plaintiffs' law firm called Labaton Sucharow LLP. That firm, in turn, has taken a keen interest in the political fortunes of Norfolk County Treasurer Joseph A. Connolly, who heads the pension fund's board. Attorneys at the New York law firm and their relatives have made 68 separate donations, of the maximum $500 apiece, to Mr. Connolly's campaign war chest since late 2005, public records show.

Asked why its lawyers gave to a county treasurer in a state not its own, Labaton Sucharow said its "members and their families make perfectly legal political contributions to elected officials and candidates who support shareholder rights." Mr. Connolly didn't respond to requests for comment.

It is legal for lawyers, like anyone else, to give campaign money to politicians. But questions arise when the politicians are local officials with influence over the selection of legal counsel for shareholder lawsuits filed by public pension funds, a role that can be lucrative.

A Wall Street Journal analysis documented the extent of campaign giving by plaintiffs' law firms specializing in shareholder litigation. It found that 25 leading firms, their lawyers and family members contributed a total of more than $21 million in the past decade to state-level candidates and party funds, as well as to national-party groups that work to elect state officials. Less than 40% went to candidates within the law firms' home states.

Labaton Sucharow was among the donation leaders. The law firm, its lawyers and their family members made $612,000 in campaign contributions in 24 states outside its New York home base in the decade.

Some lawyers say widespread political giving by plaintiffs' law firms, especially outside their home states and near the time when counsel are chosen, is evidence of a corrosive pay-to-play culture in the securities-litigation industry.

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"Plaintiffs' lawyers donate because they think it buys them access to people who make decisions over how pension funds select counsel," says Fred Isquith, a partner at Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz LLP, a plaintiffs' firm in New York. Such giving "creates an appearance of complete impropriety," he says, and "should be outlawed."

The American Bar Association takes a similar position. The ABA, in giving guidance on ethics, says lawyers shouldn't accept a "government assignment" if they made a political contribution "for the purpose of obtaining or being considered for" such a job.

The Journal looked at donations in all 50 states from Jan. 1, 2000, through mid-2009, compiled by the National Institute on Money in State Politics, as well as data from other state and federal sources. About 72% of contributions went to Democrats.

The Journal also examined the 25 largest recent class-action settlements in which public pension funds served as lead plaintiff, as calculated by NERA Economic Consulting. In 15 of the cases, one or more law firms representing a lead pension fund had donated to a politician in the fund's home state.

Most plaintiffs' lawyers say they give simply to support like-minded officials. "We make sizable contributions to candidates we believe support investor causes," said Stanley Bernstein, of the New York firm of Bernstein Liebhard LLP.

The firm and people associated with it made $1.2 million in campaign donations, mostly in 31 states other than New York. Plaintiffs' lawyers also say their contributions help offset cash from pro-business interests opposed to shareholder litigation.

Public officials who favor shareholder suits say these are a needed check on corporate misbehavior and have recovered billions of dollars of losses caused by past abuses at WorldCom, Tyco International and elsewhere. They deny any pay-to-play dynamic, and say lawyers are chosen on merit.

Public pension funds increasingly are the lead plaintiffs in shareholder suits, partly because a federal law encourages judges to pick big institutional investors for this role.

As a result, plaintiffs' law firms focus their marketing efforts on wooing public pension funds and the state and local officials who influence them. Some firms enlist the help of lobbyists and attend pension-fund conferences.

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Some lawyers say they aren't sure whether contributing helps them get government business, but are afraid not to. Some track how much rivals donate so they don't fall too far behind.

"There are certain places where, to be in the game, you have to donate," said Steven Toll, a partner at Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC in Washington. It has contributed only modestly—$62,000 to out-of-state candidates—and Mr. Toll says he is sure its low level of giving has cost the firm business. But "we want to be chosen on merit, not because we contributed money," he said.

Ohio politicians received the most donations from out-of-state plaintiffs' firms in the past decade—more than $1.65 million, by the Journal's analysis. Ohio pension funds have filed at least 21 shareholder suits since 2002, according to state officials.

Running for Ohio attorney general in 2006, Democratic candidate Marc Dann told plaintiffs' law firms he favored shareholder suits and would file more of them than his rival would, he says. He received at least $59,500 from out-of-state securities litigators.

He won, and in the next 16 months, his office filed at least four securities suits on behalf of state pension funds, mostly using law firms that had given to his campaign or to the state Democratic Party. "I have no doubt I received donations with the expectation of work," Mr. Dann said. But, he said, attorneys were chosen strictly on merit.

Legal Tenders

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How donations and decisions converged in Rhode Island. Click to see full chart.

Ohio's legislature tried to crack down on perceived pay-to-play abuses with a 2007 law that prohibited giving a state contract to any firm that had donated more than $2,000 to a politician overseeing such a contract. A court later overturned the law because of defects in the legislative process. While the law was in effect, it appeared simply to redirect the money flow to party committees.

Mr. Dann resigned after 16 months in office. After an interim appointment, the state held an election for a successor, won by another Democrat, Richard Cordray. Out-of-state plaintiffs' law firms gave little cash directly to Mr. Cordray's campaign, but in 2007 and 2008 they contributed $830,000 to the Ohio Democratic Party candidates' fund, which passed about $2 million to support Mr. Cordray.

Mr. Cordray then launched what he called an "aggressive" litigation strategy. Six law firms so far have been retained to represent Ohio pension funds in new lawsuits; five of the firms donated a total of $300,000 to the state Democratic party candidates' fund in 2008.

Mr. Cordray said the shareholder suits "have nothing to do with politics and everything to do with standing up for Ohio's pension systems, retirees and investors who have been harmed by corporate wrongdoing."

Massachusetts Treasurer Tim Cahill received campaign contributions from out-of-state plaintiffs' firms.

State officials, in deflecting pay-to-play allegations, often say they pick law firms on merit by first issuing a public "request for proposals," or RFP; law firms then compete to be on a list that pension funds will use for any future litigation. But some lawyers say the RFP process itself can be a political fund-raising opportunity.

Rhode Island General Treasurer Frank Caprio told the state Investment Commission on March 26, 2008, that he planned to issue an RFP for additional securities-litigation law firms. Five days later, Mr. Caprio received 26 campaign donations, totaling $23,000, from people associated with two New York plaintiffs' firms, Labaton Sucharow and Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP. Both were among the four selected.

Last summer, after local reporters asked about law-firm contributions, Mr. Caprio returned $54,250 from those firms and five others. His campaign committee said it hadn't solicited the donations, and returned them because Mr. Caprio "wanted to assure taxpayers that he makes decisions based on what is best for the state of Rhode Island."

Neither Bernstein Litowitz nor Labaton Sucharow had any comment on the Rhode Island matter.

Once law firms make it onto a pension fund's list of potential litigators, they typically monitor the client's holdings and suggest lawsuits when they spot a stock drop that may be due to some corporate abuse. There's no cost to the pension fund in suing, because the lawyers work on a contingent-fee basis.

In the case of CVS Caremark, on Jan. 15 a lawyer representing Labaton Sucharow contacted Norfolk County's Mr. Connolly and other Massachusetts pension-fund overseers by email.

In the message, reviewed by the Journal, the lawyer recited an alleged "fact pattern" of belated disclosures by the drugstore chain leading to the "biggest drop in 8 years" in CVS's stock price in November.

Two of the pension funds agreed to be represented by Labaton Sucharow in the suit, which alleges CVS didn't disclose certain problems early enough. CVS said it doesn't comment on pending litigation.

A third pension fund suing CVS, the Brockton (Mass.) Retirement System, also received the Labaton Sucharow solicitation, but had just signed up with another law firm. Harold Hannah, the Brockton fund's executive director, says he gets many duplicate lawsuit suggestions. "I'm tired of it," he said.

"A good portion of these cases are ginned up by the plaintiffs' attorneys who go shopping for clients," said Robert Litan, a former Clinton administration Justice Department official now at the Brookings Institution.

"It shouldn't be the case that plaintiffs' lawyers should make contributions to public officials and turn around and get legal business from them," he said. "You want the best lawyer, not the one with the biggest campaign checkbook."

Tensions over the confluence of politics and lawsuits are on show at the $40 billion Massachusetts state pension fund, which in recent years has sued companies including Bear Stearns, Schering Plough and Fannie Mae.

The pension-fund board's executive director, Michael Travaglini, seems a reluctant litigant. "Nobody has convinced me of the value" of filing such a lawsuit, he said, as opposed to simply claiming a pro-rata share of any eventual settlement in a suit filed by somebody else.

Asked why the Massachusetts board has filed shareholder suits, Mr. Travaglini said the state treasurer and the state's current and past attorneys general have been interested in using such suits to spur corporate-governance reforms. All three officials received donations from securities class-action lawyers, records show.

The state pension board's most recent hiring of securities litigators came in 2005. Mr. Travaglini says the board issued an RFP, mostly at the behest of its chairman, Massachusetts Treasurer Tim Cahill.

While the RFP was pending, Mr. Cahill received $10,000 in $500 donations from people associated with Labaton Sucharow. It was one of four firms later selected. Bernstein Liebhard lawyers and family members contributed $5,500 to Mr. Cahill in the weeks after that firm, too, was selected.

Mr. Travaglini said he didn't know about the donations and they had no effect on the selection process. Mr. Cahill said he would let Mr. Travaglini speak for him.

Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley pushed for a new RFP in 2009 to expand the state's stable of plaintiffs' law firms to as many as 12, according to Mr. Travaglini. "I said, 'This is crazy,' " he said, because his staff was already busy with lawsuit suggestions from the current four firms.

The RFP was put on hold while Ms. Coakley ran, unsuccessfully, for Ted Kennedy's vacant Senate seat. Her staff didn't respond to requests for comment.

In the biggest cases, legal fees can run in the millions. That's what happened in a suit by Calpers, the California pension fund, against UnitedHealth Group Inc., where stock options were backdated. The suit was filed for Calpers by the San Diego law firm of Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP.

That firm is a descendent of the famed plaintiffs' firm once called Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, which split in two in 2004.

Coughlin Stoia filed the suit for Calpers in July 2006. A month later, Coughlin Stoia and its attorneys contributed $107,000 to the gubernatorial campaign of Phil Angelides, who as California's then-treasurer was a member of Calpers's board.

Asked whether the donations were related to the hiring of the law firm, a spokeswoman for Mr. Angelides declined to say, but said that Mr. Angelides "was one of a number of members of the Calpers board and he had tens of thousands of donations during the eight years he was treasurer." He now leads a national board investigating the causes of the financial crisis.

Coughlin Stoia's spokesman—who previously worked for Mr. Angelides—said some of the firm's lawyers "actively support causes they believe in," including candidates.

Calpers said that its general counsel, not the board on which Mr. Angelides sat, picks outside litigators, adding that Coughlin Stoia was chosen based on its experience and resources.

The UnitedHealth suit was settled in August for $925 million. Calpers's share of that came to $3.2 million. The legal fee was $65 million. Most of it went to Coughlin Stoia.

Write to Mark Maremont at mark.maremont@wsj.com, Tom McGinty at tom.mcginty@wsj.com and Nathan Koppel at nathan.koppel@wsj.com

Thursday, November 20, 2008

Message for HR

Americans are experiencing significant pain and not a little anger from the worldwide plunge in the financial markets. Millions of employees are worried about their pension plans and retirement accounts. HR undoubtedly shares their employees' concerns, both for them as individuals and also for corporate compensation, morale and motivation objectives. Finger pointing about the financial and economic crisis has been taking place in order that corrective actions for the future may be taken. The below article does additional finger pointing towards that end. Employees and HR may consider the article worthy of their attention.

Why Aren’t Retirement Plan Trustees Screaming Bloody Murder?

Why aren’t retirement plan trustees screaming bloody murder?

At 5:30 p.m. this coming Friday, November 21st, there will be held in the federal district court in New York City a settlement hearing in a class action securities lawsuit bearing the name Monster Worldwide, Inc. Securities Litigation (http://www.berdonclaims.com/cases/details.asp?p=Main&CaseID=246). The lead plaintiff in this class action against Monster is Middlesex County Retirement System of Massachusetts.

The Monster case is cookie cutter litigation that the plaintiffs’ lawyers have been trotting around the country in recent years. In these cases, there are shareholders with real financial losses; there are also persons who are lucky and by chance walk away with windfall gains corresponding to those shareholder losses; and the plaintiffs lawyers have the shareholders with the losses sue the corporation for their losses. In the end, windfall gains remain in the hands of parties who are not before the court, and the lawsuit generates a circular payment that accomplishes a shuffling around of the losses among the shareholders who experienced the losses and also shifting a part of the losses to other shareholders who did not have losses (or windfall gain), and also shifts a part to some of the lucky persons who had windfall gains and who, by chance, are subject to a some partial reclamation of their windfall gains. In addition, the shareholder losses in question are more than just shuffled around; they are increased in total by the huge cut taken by the plaintiffs’ lawyers and also by very sizable fees of the lawyers who have to be hired to defend the corporation in the lawsuit.

Does the foregoing sound crazy? It is crazy, and you would think that, instead of aiding and abetting the plaintiffs’ lawyers in this type of litigation, Middlesex County Retirement System, as well as every other governmental retirement system and corporate retirement plan trustee in the country, would be screaming bloody murder about such craziness. Maybe the reason they have not done so is that they have just been plain snookered by a plaintiffs’ lawyers’ sleight of hand.

Some further detail is needed to explain this.

These class action lawsuits occur in the context of an accounting or other stock price related fraud that has occurred (or allegedly occurred).

If there has been such fraud, accountants, and officers and directors and others, who participated in the fraud should be held liable for damages, fines and imprisonment under applicable civil and criminal securities fraud laws. Also if the corporation sold stock and received the proceeds in connection with the fraud, there is a legitimate claim for recovery against the corporation. Neither persons such as officers, directors or accountants, nor proceeds received by the corporation, are the crux of the cookie cutter litigation exemplified by the Monster lawsuit. The crux is a tricky sleight of hand by the plaintiff’s lawyers.

The plaintiffs’ lawyers sue the corporation and third parties such as officers and directors and accountants. They allege that the defendants perpetrated the accounting or other fraud that resulted in the price of the corporation’s stock being artificially inflated during a period of time starting when the fraud began and ending when the fraud became publicly known, thereby causing the stock price to no longer be artificially inflated by reason of the fraud.

Now comes the sleight of hand by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. If there was fraud and the stock price was artificially inflated for a period of time, some persons (let’s call them the “unlucky” shareholders) who bought shares in the marketplace during that period will indeed experience losses from the fraud. The problems is, for every unlucky shareholder who bought shares and paid an artificially inflated price, the seller of those shares in the marketplace (let’s call these shareholders the “lucky” shareholders) got a windfall gain of receiving an artificially inflated price and that windfall gain is then in their pockets. The situation is thus that there are unlucky shareholders who have real financial losses from the fraud, there are the lucky shareholders who got windfall gains equal to the losses, and there are innocent bystander shareholders who did not receive any windfall gain but who also did not experience any losses (such as shareholders who bought before the start of the artificially inflated period and did not sell before the end of the period, or shareholders who bought after the end of the inflation period) .The sleight of hand of the plaintiffs lawyers is to keep mum about the fact that there will not be recovery from the lucky shareholders the windfall gains that they got by chance as a result of the fraud and who have walked away with such gains, and instead the plaintiffs lawyers will shuffle the losses around by having the shareholders who experienced the losses sue the corporation that generates a big payment from the corporation which is divvied up among unlucky shareholders who had losses from the fraud in proportion to the amount of their losses from the fraud.

How does this shake out? The burden of the big payment from the corporation is shared on an equal share basis by all current shareholders. The “lucky” shareholders who are no longer shareholders and have walked away with their windfall gains will bear no burden of the corporation’s big payment and their windfall gains will be completely untouched. “Lucky” shareholders who sold shares at an inflated price and got a windfall gain and who are still shareholders at the end of the inflation period because they did not sell all their shares or because they bought back shares at a lesser price will bear a burden of the corporation’s big payment in proportion to the shares they own at the end of the period, they will not get any share of the big corporate payment, and hence they have their windfall gain reduced to some extent. Innocent bystander shareholders (such as those who bought before the beginning of the artificial inflation period and held their shares throughout the period) have a share of the losses shifted onto them through their share of the burden of the big corporate payment. As to “unlucky” shareholders, some may no longer be shareholders, bear no burden of the corporation’s big payment, and will have their losses reduced by receiving their share of the big payment. Of the “unlucky” shareholders who are current shareholders, some will have their loss reduced on a net basis because their share of the burden of the big corporate payment by the corporation will be less than the share of the payment they receive based on the amount of their losses; for other “unlucky” shareholders, the burden of the corporation’s big payment on them will be greater than the share of the corporation’s big payment that they receive based on their amount of losses, so, on a net basis, their loss will be increased as a result of the litigation.

The plaintiffs’ lawyers big fee will come out of the corporation’s big payment, and the corporation will also pay sizable attorney fees to the corporation’s lawyers representing it in the class action lawsuit. All of these legal fees will increase the aggregate loss ultimately borne by the “unlucky” shareholders and by the innocent bystander shareholders.

In the Monster class action, the amount of the big corporate payment (the burden of which is borne by all current shareholders on an equal per share basis) will be $47,500,000. Presumably. the lucky shareholders in Monster obtained total windfall gains of at least that amount (and perhaps many times that amount). To an unknown extent there will be lucky shareholders who have walked away with their windfall gains and these windfall gains will be completely untouched by the litigation. The plaintiffs lawyers will take 25% of the $47,500,000, and the balance will be distributed among shareholders who had losses from the fraud. The net effect of this increases total losses by the aggregate of all attorney fees (25% of $47,500,000 for the plaintiffs attorneys plus whatever fees Monster has to pay to its lawyers) and shuffles $47,500,000 of the losses around as previously described, i.e., some “unlucky” shareholders effectively have their losses decreased, some "unlucky" shareholders have their losses increased, some of the losses get shuffled onto innocent bystander shareholders, and some “lucky” shareholders have their windfall gains reduced.

In 2007 there was consummated a cookie cutter class action involving Tyco Corporation (see http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/11/01/three-plaintiffs-firms-to-ask-for-460-million-in-tyco-suit/?mod=WSJBlog#commentsThe) that had much more eye popping numbers. In that case, the big corporate payment from Tyco was $2,975,000,000 (total windfall gains of lucky Tyco stockholders presumably being at least that much, and possibly many times more), and the plaintiffs’ lawyers claimed $460,000,000 in attorneys fees for their services. Those services increased total losses by the amount of the fee plus the amount of legal fees of Tyco’s lawyers and shifted otherwise shifted around $2,975,000,000 in losses among the shareholders who had losses from the fraud and shuffling some of the losses onto innocent bystander shareholders of Tyco, to some chance extent reduced some of the windfall gains of some of the lucky Tyco stockholders in Tyco. In a further cookie cutterclass action that is currently being finalized involving Xerox Corporation (http://www.gilardi.com/xeroxsettlement), the amount of the big circular corporate payment will be $670,000,000, and the cut of the plaintiffs' lawyers will be 20%, or $134,000,000.

To repeat,you would think that, instead of aiding and abetting the plaintiffs lawyers in the Monster class action, Middlesex County Retirement System, as well as every other governmental retirement system and corporate retirement plan trustee in the country, would be screaming bloody murder about the craziness their stock investments are being subjected to by these kinds of lawsuits. Maybe the reason they have not so is that they have been just plain snookered by the plaintiffs’’ lawyers’ sleight of hand.

Our country is on the brink of its worst economic crisis in decades, and our country's huge governmental retirement systems, as well as thousands of private pension plans, and millions of 401(k) owners, have now collectively experienced trillions of dollars of losses in the financial markets. Maybe governmental retirement systems and corporate retirement plan trustees will stop being snookered and start screaming bloody murder about what the plaintiffs lawyers have been doing in order for the lawyers to enrich themselves by possibly billions of dollars and thereby pile on further reductions in the value of stock investments of the retirement plans. (For further commentary on plaintiff lawyers' predations on innocent bystander shareholder value, go here.)

Why aren’t government retirement systems screaming bloody murder?

At 5:30 p.m. this coming Friday, November 21st, there will be held in the federal district court in New York City a settlement hearing in a class action securities lawsuit bearing the name Monster Worldwide, Inc. Securities Litigation (http://www.berdonclaims.com/cases/details.asp?p=Main&CaseID=246). The lead plaintiff in this class action against Monster is Middlesex County Retirement System of Massachusetts.

The Monster case is cookie cutter litigation that the plaintiffs’ lawyers have been trotting around the country in recent years. In these cases, there are shareholders with real financial losses; there are also persons who are lucky and by chance walk away with windfall gains corresponding to those shareholder losses; and the plaintiffs lawyers have the shareholders with the losses sue the corporation for their losses. In the end, windfall gains remain in the hands of parties who are not before the court, and the lawsuit generates a circular payment that accomplishes a shuffling around of the losses among the shareholders who experienced the losses and also shifting a part of the losses to other shareholders who did not have losses (or windfall gain), and also shifts a part to some of the lucky persons who had windfall gains and who, by chance, are subject to a some partial reclamation of their windfall gains. In addition, the shareholder losses in question are more than just shuffled around; they are increased in total by the huge cut taken by the plaintiffs’ lawyers and also by very sizable fees of the lawyers who have to be hired to defend the corporation in the lawsuit.

Does the foregoing sound crazy? It is crazy, and you would think that, instead of aiding and abetting the plaintiffs’ lawyers in this type of litigation, Middlesex County Retirement System, as well as every other governmental retirement system in the country, would be screaming bloody murder about such craziness. Maybe the reason they have not done so is that they have just been plain snookered by a plaintiffs’ lawyers’ sleight of hand.

Some further detail is needed to explain this.

These class action lawsuits occur in the context of an accounting or other stock price related fraud that has occurred (or allegedly occurred).

If there has been such fraud, accountants, and officers and directors and others, who participated in the fraud should be held liable for damages, fines and imprisonment under applicable civil and criminal securities fraud laws. Also if the corporation sold stock and received the proceeds in connection with the fraud, there is a legitimate claim for recovery against the corporation. Neither persons such as officers, directors or accountants, nor proceeds received by the corporation, are the crux of the cookie cutter litigation exemplified by the Monster lawsuit. The crux is a tricky sleight of hand by the plaintiff’s lawyers.

The plaintiffs’ lawyers sue the corporation and third parties such as officers and directors and accountants. They allege that the defendants perpetrated the accounting or other fraud that resulted in the price of the corporation’s stock being artificially inflated during a period of time starting when the fraud began and ending when the fraud became publicly known, thereby causing the stock price to no longer be artificially inflated by reason of the fraud.

Now comes the sleight of hand by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. If there was fraud and the stock price was artificially inflated for a period of time, some persons (let’s call them the “unlucky” shareholders) who bought shares in the marketplace during that period will indeed experience losses from the fraud. The problems is, for every unlucky shareholder who bought shares and paid an artificially inflated price, the seller of those shares in the marketplace (let’s call these shareholders the “lucky” shareholders) got a windfall gain of receiving an artificially inflated price and that windfall gain is then in their pockets. The situation is thus that there are unlucky shareholders who have real financial losses from the fraud, there are the lucky shareholders who got windfall gains equal to the losses, and there are innocent bystander shareholders who did not receive any windfall gain but who also did not experience any losses (such as shareholders who bought before the start of the artificially inflated period and did not sell before the end of the period, or shareholders who bought after the end of the inflation period) .The sleight of hand of the plaintiffs lawyers is to keep mum about the fact that there will not be recovery from the lucky shareholders the windfall gains that they got by chance as a result of the fraud and who have walked away with such gains, and instead the plaintiffs lawyers will shuffle the losses around by having the shareholders who experienced the losses sue the corporation that generates a big payment from the corporation which is divvied up among unlucky shareholders who had losses from the fraud in proportion to the amount of their losses from the fraud.

How does this shake out? The burden of the big payment from the corporation is shared on an equal share basis by all current shareholders. The “lucky” shareholders who are no longer shareholders and have walked away with their windfall gains will bear no burden of the corporation’s big payment and their windfall gains will be completely untouched. “Lucky” shareholders who sold shares at an inflated price and got a windfall gain and who are still shareholders at the end of the inflation period because they did not sell all their shares or because they bought back shares at a lesser price will bear a burden of the corporation’s big payment in proportion to the shares they own at the end of the period, they will not get any share of the big corporate payment, and hence they have their windfall gain reduced to some extent. Innocent bystander shareholders (such as those who bought before the beginning of the artificial inflation period and held their shares throughout the period) have a share of the losses shifted onto them through their share of the burden of the big corporate payment. As to “unlucky” shareholders, some may no longer be shareholders, bear no burden of the corporation’s big payment, and will have their losses reduced by receiving their share of the big payment. Of the “unlucky” shareholders who are current shareholders, some will have their loss reduced on a net basis because their share of the burden of the big corporate payment by the corporation will be less than the share of the payment they receive based on the amount of their losses; for other “unlucky” shareholders, the burden of the corporation’s big payment on them will be greater than the share of the corporation’s big payment that they receive based on their amount of losses, so, on a net basis, their loss will be increased as a result of the litigation.

The plaintiffs’ lawyers big fee will come out of the corporation’s big payment, and the corporation will also pay sizable attorney fees to the corporation’s lawyers representing it in the class action lawsuit. All of these legal fees will increase the aggregate loss ultimately borne by the “unlucky” shareholders and by the innocent bystander shareholders.

In the Monster class action, the amount of the big corporate payment (the burden of which is borne by all current shareholders on an equal per share basis) will be $47,500,000. Presumably. the lucky shareholders in Monster obtained total windfall gains of at least that amount (and perhaps many times that amount). To an unknown extent there will be lucky shareholders who have walked away with their windfall gains and these windfall gains will be completely untouched by the litigation. The plaintiffs lawyers will take 25% of the $47,500,000, and the balance will be distributed among shareholders who had losses from the fraud. The net effect of this increases total losses by the aggregate of all attorney fees (25% of $47,500,000 for the plaintiffs attorneys plus whatever fees Monster has to pay to its lawyers) and shuffles $47,500,000 of the losses around as previously described, i.e., some “unlucky” shareholders effectively have their losses decreased, some "unlucky" shareholders have their losses increased, some of the losses get shuffled onto innocent bystander shareholders, and some “lucky” shareholders have their windfall gains reduced.

In 2007 there was consummated a cookie cutter class action involving Tyco Corporation (see http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/11/01/three-plaintiffs-firms-to-ask-for-460-million-in-tyco-suit/?mod=WSJBlog#commentsThe) that had much more eye popping numbers. In that case, the big corporate payment from Tyco was $2,975,000,000 (total windfall gains of lucky Tyco stockholders presumably being at least that much, and possibly many times more), and the plaintiffs’ lawyers claimed $460,000,000 in attorneys fees for their services. Those services increased total losses by the amount of the fee plus the amount of legal fees of Tyco’s lawyers and shifted otherwise shifted around $2,975,000,000 in losses among the shareholders who had losses from the fraud and shuffling some of the losses onto innocent bystander shareholders of Tyco, to some chance extent reduced some of the windfall gains of some of the lucky Tyco stockholders in Tyco. In a further cookie cutterclass action that is currently being finalized involving Xerox Corporation (http://www.gilardi.com/xeroxsettlement), the amount of the big circular corporate payment will be $670,000,000, and the cut of the plaintiffs' lawyers will be 20%, or $134,000,000.

To repeat,you would think that, instead of aiding and abetting the plaintiffs lawyers in the Monster class action, Middlesex County Retirement System, as well as every other governmental retirement system in the country, would be screaming bloody murder about the craziness their stock investments are being subjected to by these kinds of lawsuits. Maybe the reason they have not so is that they have been just plain snookered by the plaintiffs’’ lawyers’ sleight of hand.

Our country is on the brink of its worst economic crisis in decades, and our country's huge governmental retirement systems, as well as thousands of private pension plans, and millions of 401(k) owners, have now collectively experienced trillions of dollars of losses in the financial markets. Maybe governmental retirement systems will stop being snookered and start screaming bloody murder about what the plaintiffs lawyers have been doing in order for the lawyers to enrich themselves by possibly billions of dollars and thereby pile on further reductions in the value of stock investments of the retirement systems. (For further commentary on plaintiff lawyers' predations on innocent bystander shareholder value, go here.)

Friday, November 14, 2008

Letter to Dr. David Bronner, Alabama Retirement Systems

From: RDShatt
To: ersinfo@rsa-al.gov
Sent: 11/14/2008 4:39:30 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Letter for Dr. David Bronner re: Middlesex County Retirement System


Letter for Dr. David Bronner re: Middlesex County Retirement System

Dear Dr. Bronner:

I have sent the below email to Mr. Thomas Gibson, Chairman of the Middlesex County Retirement System in Massachusetts. In my email to Mr. Gibson, I ask why the Middlesex County Retirement System is the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against Monster Worldwide, Inc. that aids and abets plaintiffs' lawyers in their enterprise of having shareholders of corporations sue themselves to recover investment losses the shareholders have experienced and to have the shareholders make circular payments to themselves (that don't compensate for the losses because the shareholders are effectively making payment to themselves), all so that the plaintiffs lawyers can take a big cut and leave the shareholders all the poorer.

Our country is on the brink of its worst economic crisis in decades. The Retirement Systems of Alabama and other governmental retirement systems, as well as thousands of private pension plans, and millions of 401(k) owners, have collectively experienced trillions of dollars of losses in the financial markets, while plaintiffs lawyers are going around the country having shareholders sue themselves in order that the plaintiffs lawyers can collect hundreds of millions of dollars of fees for themselves.and make the shareholders, including The Retirement Systems of Alabama, all the poorer.

Is my analysis correct? Am I missing something here? Why aren't governmental retirement systems screaming bloody murder about this? Would you mind taking the time to answer these questions?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, AL 35223
(205) 967-5586


[email sent to Mr. Thomas Gibson]

Email to Steven Syre of Boston Globe

From: RDShatt
To: syre@globe.com
Sent: 11/13/2008 7:21:08 P.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Middlesex County Retirement System

Dear Mr. Syre,

This email may seem meddlesome coming from a resident of Alabama, but I think, upon your full consideration that all citizens of the United States are affected, you will not see me as inappropriately meddling.

I have sent the below email to Mr. Thomas Gibson, Chairman of the Middlesex County Retirement System. In my email to Mr. Gibson, I ask why the Retirement System is the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against Monster Worldwide, Inc. that aids and abets plaintiffs' lawyers in their enterprise of having shareholders of corporations sue themselves to recover investment losses the shareholders have experienced and to have the shareholders make circular payments to themselves (that don't compensate for the losses because the shareholders are effectively making payment to themselves), all so that the plaintiffs lawyers can take a big cut and leave the shareholders all the poorer.

I hope you will take an interest in this story. I have some ways in mind that I am going to pursue this matter further, and I will keep you informed of what I do.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, AL 35223
(205) 967-5586


[email sent to Mr. Thomas Gibson]

Email to Middlesex County directors and staff

From: RDShatt
To: Tgibson@middlesexretirement.org
Sent: 11/13/2008 11:52:42 A.M. Central Standard Time
Subj: Re: Middlesex County Retirement System v. Monster Worldwide Inc.


Re: Middlesex County Retirement System v. Monster Worldwide Inc.


To the Directors and Staff of Middlesex County Retirement System:

Your Retirement System is the plaintiff Class Representative in the above class action lawsuit. (For more information about your Retirement System's lawsuit you can go here: http://www.berdonclaims.com/cases/details.asp?p=Main&CaseID=246.)

Do you understand your Retirement System's lawsuit?

Do you understand how your plaintiffs lawyers and others like them are going around the country with this kind of litigation and filing lawsuits that are in substance shareholders of a corporation who have had losses suing themselves to recover the losses, the plaintiffs lawyers have the shareholders effectively make a payment to themselves (that doesn't compensate for any losses because the shareholders are paying it to themselves), and the plaintiffs lawyers take a big cut out of the payment and leave the shareholders that much the poorer on top of the investment losses the shareholders previously experienced?

In your Retirement System's lawsuit against Monster Worldwide, Inc., your Retirement System and other shareholders of Monster Worldwide, Inc. experienced investment losses and they are in effect going to make a payment to themselves of $47.5 million and the Retirement System's plaintiffs lawyers in the case, Labaton Sucharow LLP of New York City, will take a 25% cut of that, and leave your Retirement System and other shareholders with increased losses. Other class action plaintiffs lawyers are in the process of doing the same thing to Xerox Corpopration shareholders and having the Xerox shareholders in effect sue themselves to recover investment losses (which won't be recovered and will only be increased), and I wrote a letter to the judge in that Xerox case that details this insanity. You may read that letter here: Letter to Judge Thompson. The plaintiffs lawyers in the Xerox case previously had Tyco Corporation shareholders sue themselves, and the lawyers took a whopping $465,000,000 out of the pockets of the shareholders, which you can read about in the Wall Street Journal Blog. (Maybe your Retirement System owned Xerox or Tyco stock and had investment losses that were increased courtesy of these plaintiffs lawyers.)

Our country is on the brink of its worst economic crisis in decades. Your Retirement System and other governmental retirement systems, as well as thousands of private pension plans, and millions of 401(k) owners, have collectively experienced trillions of dollars of losses in the financial markets, while these plaintiffs lawyers are going around the country having shareholders sue themselves in order that the plaintiffs lawyers can collect hundreds of millions of dollars of fees for themselves.and make the shareholders all the poorer.

That should make you very angry.

I hope you will ask yourselves why is your Retirement System involved in the Monster Worldwide litigation and why is your Retirement System aiding an abetting these plaintiffs lawyers in their enterprise of having shareholders of corporations sue themselves to recover investment losses and make payments to themselves (that don't compensate them for losses because they are effectively making payment to themselves), all so that the plaintiffs lawyers can take a big cut and leave the shareholders all the poorer.

After you have had internal discussion at the Retirement System, I hope someone on behalf of the Retirement System will ask the Retirement System's class action lawyer Ms. Zeiss of Labaton Sucharow LLP to explain and defend this insanity. After that, I further hope someone on behalf of the Retirement System will go to the fairness hearing scheduled for next Friday in the federal district court in New York City and ask the judge in the case also to explain and defend the insanity.

Sincerely,
Robert Shattuck
3812 Spring Valley Circle
Birmingham, AL 35223
(205) 967-5586

Middlesex County Retirement System

The Middlesex County Retirement System in Massachussetts is the lead plaintiff in a class action lawsuit against Monster Worldwide, Inc. that, in my opinion, aids and abets plaintiffs' lawyers in their enterprise of having shareholders of corporations sue themselves to recover investment losses the shareholders have experienced and to have the shareholders make circular payments to themselves (that don't compensate for the losses because the shareholders are effectively making payment to themselves), all so that the plaintiffs lawyers can take a big cut and leave the shareholders all the poorer.

Our country is on the brink of its worst economic crisis in decades. Governmental retirement systems, including in my state of Alabama, as well as thousands of private pension plans, and millions of 401(k) owners, have collectively experienced trillions of dollars of losses in the financial markets, while plaintiffs lawyers are going around the country having shareholders sue themselves in order that the plaintiffs lawyers can collect hundreds of millions of dollars of fees for themselves.and make the shareholders, including such retirement systems, pension plans and 401(k) plans, all the poorer.

I think trustees and corporate sponsors should be screaming bloody murder.

We'll see.